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Abstract
This study examines the impact of local income taxation on migration
by using the Tiebout hypothesis. By studying the municipalities in the
old Malmöhus region during 1992-2012 it is found that the level of a local
income tax rate does not deter migrants, while a high tax rate relative
to the average in the area does. The study identifies that the tax rate of
neighbouring municipalities affects migration. Smaller municipalities are
negatively affected by an increase in the tax rate of a larger neighbour.
The results suggest that smaller municipalities are more sensitive to tax
competition. The impact of local expenditures is less conclusive. By
modifying the specification from expenditures per capita to per user, the
results from the tobit estimation show that local expenditures on child care
do have a positive impact on migration, which confirms earlier findings.
Keywords: Tiebout, local income taxation, local public goods, migration, mu-
nicipality
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1 Introduction
In Sweden taxes and tax levels are central in political debates, especially close to
an election. The focus of the discussion is often on the central level tax rate, and
not on the municipality tax (Linder, 2012). However, the local tax is important
to discuss and evaluate since everyone is affected by it, one way or another.
Either you work and pay income tax, or as a child you go to school or you may
receive social assistance. In Sweden there are 290 municipalities with their own
local government elected by the residents every fourth year. The income tax rate
and the expenditures in the municipality are determined by the local government
and vary across different municipalities and time. For instance, in 1992 the
income tax rate was as low as 16.52 in Sjöbo, while the highest rate, 30.02, was
observed in Malmö in 1998.1 This study will focus on municipality income tax
and its influence on people’s behaviour concerning the decision where to live.
Specifically, I will look at the casual effect of income tax rates on migration by
using the Tiebout hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that, simplified, people
reveal their preferences for pubic goods, and the corresponding funding, when
deciding which community to move to. Various aspects are taken into account,
for example job opportunities, financial status, life situation, social life, and,
the focus of this study and in the Tiebout hypothesis, what people prefer when
considering local public good expenditures and income taxes. Some might prefer
high expenditures by the municipality and correspondingly high taxes, and some
low taxes and less expenditure. It all depends on individual’s preferences and
what maximises utility. For the municipality and its politicians, in short terms
at least, they can only affect the income tax rate and public expenditures, not
employment opportunities and accommodation possibilities. Therefore, it is
important for local politicians to have knowledge about preferences concerning
income tax rates and public expenditures. Since people choose the municipality
which matches their preferences the best, it is important to evaluate the impact
of neighbouring municipalities’ characteristics as well. The study will therefore
also examine the effect of income tax rates of neighbouring municipalities on
the location decision.
The purpose of this study is to examine in what way taxes affect intra-
1Max and min from the data set used in this study.
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country migration in a Tiebout framework. To evaluate this, I attempt to
answer two questions;
• How do local income tax rates affect migration?
• Are there any differences in sensitivity among the municipalities?
This is done by analysing migration patterns in old Malmöhus region during
the time period 1992-2012. The study also examines if there are any differences
between migrants as a whole group and families with children and retirees. Ad-
ditional, it analyses whether there are any changes in patterns after year 2000.
The study contributes to the existing research on the Tiebout framework by
analysing what effect municipality income tax rates have on residence choice.
Most research on migration and taxes has been on property tax and this study
complement the existing research by focusing on local income taxes. The impor-
tance of this field must be stressed, because if local politicians truly understand
individual preferences and migration behaviour in terms of local tax rates and
expenditures, municipalities would be able to customise the local public goods
provided by the local income tax. Additional, knowledge of these preferences
can increase efficiency in the use of tax revenues. If the tax revenues are not used
efficiently, then the residents move to another municipality where they receive
more for their tax payments.
The main responsibilities for municipalities are to provide child care, elderly
care and education. They also provide culture, libraries and parks (The Swedish
Government, 2013). However, education has not always been provided by the
local government. Before 1991 education expenditures were provided by the
central level (SKL, 2011). Since education is a large share of total expenditures,
thus, affecting the tax rate, this study includes data from 1992 to 2012. The
study is also restrained by the choice of municipalities to include, which is lim-
ited to the old region Malmöhus. The restriction to only include municipalities
belonging to old Malmöhus is motivated by the fusion of Malmöhus and Kris-
tianstad into Region Skåne in 1997. Before 1997, there were differences in tax
rate at regional level, which possibly also influenced the decision of where to
live. By only including old Malmöhus, disturbance due to regional differences
would be avoided. Another argument to only include old Malmöhus in the anal-
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ysis is the job market. In the area of Malmöhus, it is assumed to be possible to
commute, hence, the job situation is being controlled for. What people actu-
ally do when receiving a job offer placed in a different municipality, cannot be
examined and are outside the framework of this essay. This study relies on the
assumption of old Malmöhus being one single job market and that it is possible
to commute.
I find that the level of a local income tax rate does not deter migrants, while
the income tax rate relative to the average income tax rate in the area does.
The total effect is however negative since the impact of relative tax outweighs
the positive of tax rate. Another important finding is that the tax rate of
neighbouring municipalities affects the migration. For smaller municipalities
the migration is negatively affected by an increase in the tax rate of a larger
neighbour, and symmetrically, the migration of a large municipality is positively
affected by an increase in the tax rate of a smaller neighbour. The results suggest
that smaller municipalities are more sensitive to tax competition, similar to what
can be seen on country level. These findings suggest that local politicians should
be aware of what their colleagues in other municipalities do.
The disposition of the essay is organised as follows. In the next section theory
will be presented. Section 3 discusses previous research briefly and the model
is derived in section 4. In the following section, 5, the data is described and the
results are shown and discussed in section 6. Finally, in section 7 concluding
remarks are offered.
2 Theory
In economics it is common to assume that people maximise their utility. Given
individual specific preferences people choose the most preferable bundle of goods
given their budget restrictions. In terms of public goods the consumer pays
taxes instead of paying a special price for a certain good. Some public goods are
provided most efficiently on a central level, such as defence, and others on a local
level, such as schooling and child care.2 Then communities can offer different
bundles of public goods and corresponding taxes, to finance the expenditures,
2For further discussion on efficiency of providing public goods on central versus local level,
suggested reading Hindriks and Myles, 2013.
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in order to attract households.
The Tiebout hypothesis states that, when there exist sufficiently many differ-
ent communities, people choose the community which matches their preferences
the best, i.e. which maximises utility. When choosing community, people reveal
their true preferences. This is also referred to as “voting with their feet” (Hin-
driks and Myles, 2013). Or as Tiebout (1956, p. 418) himself explained, ”the
consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies
his preferences for public goods . . . the consumer-voter moves to that commu-
nity whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences”. Tullock (1971)
expands this theory by including taxes as an aspect people take into account
when deciding which community to live in. Hence, Tullock emphasise that both
taxes and public goods provided by the local government affects the decision
(Cebula and Clark, 2013).
The theory relies on several assumptions. First, as already mentioned, there
must be a sufficient amount of communities. Second, consumers are assumed
to be able to choose freely between different communities. This assumption
needs the housing market to be efficient in order to be fulfilled, meaning, the
possibility of finding accommodation in the preferred community should not
affect the decision. Third, when consumers receive income from employment, for
the hypothesis to hold it is necessarily that all communities offer all employment
prospects. If not, communities which offer better employment opportunities
will be preferable, even if another one provides a more attractive bundle of
public goods (Hindriks and Myles, p. 213). Hindriks and Myles identify the no
transaction cost assumption in the housing market as the key assumption for
the hypothesis. If there exists significant transaction costs, such as legal fees
and real estate agent fees, the freedom of moving to another more preferable
community will be limited.
The assumptions of the theory have been criticised as not being realistic. For
example, the results from Downing et al (1994) was mixed and they doubted
the application of the theory, since it assumes perfect knowledge of all bundles
of public goods and taxes offered by the different communities. But, as Tiebout
(1956, p. 423) explains, “Consumer-voters do not have perfect knowledge and
set preferences, nor are they perfectly mobile. The question is how do people
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actually react in choosing a community?”. Another discussed limitation of the
model is the assumption of perfect mobility and ignoring that employment op-
portunities, most of them at least, are bounded to specific areas (Liebig, 2007).
This in mind, Mieszowski and Zodrow (1989) suggest that for a given job the
migration occur within nearby communities. Hence, to evaluate the effect of
taxes and public goods provided, one should limit the analysis of migration
within a commuting distance (Liebig, 2007).
Additional to the Tiebout hypothesis, John et al. (1995) argue that factors
which affecting the migration decision can be categorised into two opposite
effects, push and pull factors. Push factors are variables which motivate people
to move out of an area, while pull factors attract migrants to the municipality.
This will be further discussed in the Data section, where the variables will be
categorised intuitively into push and pull factors.
To summarise, the choice of residence location depends on different factors
and the Tiebout hypothesis suggests, when controlling for job market, that lo-
cally provided public goods and tax rates are important factors that people take
into consideration. With this theoretical framework in mind, the econometric
model will be derived in section 4, but next a brief review of previous research
will be presented.
3 Previous research
Ever since Tiebout (1956) published his hypothesis it has been a topic for ex-
tensive empirical research. The theory has been further explained by Tullock
(1971) and tested empirically (Epple, Zelenitz and Visscher, 1978; Gramlich and
Rubinfield, 1982; Hamilton, 1976; Oates, 1969). The research on the Tiebout
hypothesis can be divided into two fields, one which focus on the effect of the
right-hand side; public goods provided by the local government, and the other
one focus on the left-hand side; what finance the expenditures.
In the widespread discussion about expenditures by the local government
and internal migration Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) find evidence of correlation
between exogenous improvement in public goods and population density. Fur-
thermore, this finding, that people tend to actually vote with their feet when
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facing changes in public goods, is supported by Bayer and Timmins (2007); Fer-
reyra (2007); Kahn (2000). Using Swedish data, Dahlberg et al (2012) examine
the impact of local public goods on the community decision of households. They
find that childcare is an important service when it comes to choosing where to
live, while education and elderly care are not as significant. Furthermore, the
Tiebout hypothesis has also been strongly criticised for its lack of real-world
assumptions (Brewley, 1981).
As I previously mentioned, the other field focuses on the subject of financ-
ing public goods, i.e. taxes. The majority of research in this field focuses on
property taxation, since in most countries, as in the US and Canada, property
taxes are decided on a local level and are in many cases the most important
income for the local government (Liebig, 2007). Islam et al (1991) examined
the causality between property taxation and inter-municipality migration in
Canada and found support for the Tiebout hypothesis. Grassmueck (2011) on
the other hand, found evidence of people being attracted by higher property
taxes and corresponding higher local governmental spending on public goods.
However, Cebula and Clark (2013) concluded people were attracted by higher
expenditures on schools and lower property tax rates.
This strand of research, local property taxation, has been extensive (Oates,
1969; Hamilton 1976; Cebula, 1979; Greenwood, 1985; Ross and Yinger, 1999;
Epple and Nechyba, 2004) while investigating the effect of local taxation has
been less numerous. However, Cebula and Clark (2012) took in to account
both property and income tax rates when examining migration in a Tiebout
framework, and the results showed people were attracted to states with high
expenditures on schooling and low property and income taxes.
Little research has been made in the field of migration and income taxation,
and Schmidheiny (2006) highlights this matter when investigating whether there
exist segregated equilibriums due to income taxation when households differ in
both preferences and income. His results suggest that it is more likely for rich
households to move to a low tax municipality than for low income household.
Moreover, Liebig et al (2007) examines the relationship between internal migra-
tion and income taxation in Switzerland. Their results supports the Tiebout
framework, and the group who is most sensitive to different rates of local income
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taxation in their decision making where to live, is young college graduates.
To summarise, extensive research is done in Tiebout’s aftermath. Economists
have examined the relationship between locally provided public goods and inter-
nal migration, which, to some extent, supports Tiebout and the phenomena of
voting with one’s feet. Furthermore, the impact of property taxation has been
well examined, though research on the effect of income taxation is still rare.
4 Model
First, individuals’ decision process is determined by maximising utility. Hence,
if another community generates greater utility, and there exists no migration
costs, people move (Schmidheiny, 2006). This setting can be illustrated by
uij > uic (1)
Where individual i choose municipality j over all other c if and only if it
maximises utility.
Further, following Dahlberg et al and assuming preferences are additively
separable, the utility function can be written as:
uic = ac + z(ωic) +m(chc, edc, ec, oc) + ic (2)
Where ac refer to community amenities, ωic is private good consumption,
chc is childcare expenditure, edc is education expenditure, ec is elderly care
expenditure and oc is other expenditures. ic is the random component and
i and c are index for individual i and community c. The individual faces the
budget constraint:
yi(1− τc) = pcωic (3)
Where yi denotes income and τc is tax rate. The right side refers to con-
sumption of private goods, i.e. price times quantity. This because local public
goods and services are financed by tax revenues. When combining these two
equations, (2) and (3), we get (Dahlberg et al, p.322)
9
uic = ac + β1ln(1− τc) + β2ln(pc) + β3ln(chc)+
+β4ln(edc) + β5ln(ec) + β6ln(oc) + ic (4)
Were it is assumed z(.) and m(.) are logarithmic and yi is ignored since indi-
vidual income does not vary among different municipalities. The βi coefficients
are interpreted as marginal effects, for example, β1 is the marginal utility of tax
rate, to be precise, the percentage left of income after paying taxes.
Schmidheiny (2006) observed problems when ignoring the endogeneity prob-
lem inherited in aggregated data. Liebig (2007) explains further; “since commu-
nity characteristics are themselves influenced by inhabitant choices, only com-
munity characteristics from the perspective of the individual household can be
accepted as a given” (p. 811), which both use as an argument for preferring
micro data on households when analysing the effect of tax rates on migration.
However, this type of data is not always available. Grassmueck (2011) for exam-
ple solves the obstacle of using OLS on aggregated data by cluster-correction of
the standard errors. He argues that the residuals do not fulfill the independence
assumption and are likely to be positively correlated when using aggregated
data, i.e. they are clustered.
Since I use panel data on municipality level and not on individual level,
generalising equation (4) gives
Uct = X
T
ctβ + ct (5)
Where migration is assumed to occur when uij > uic. Then (5) can be
rewritten in panel form
Mct = αc +X
T
ctβ + ct (6)
Where Mct is the migration, defined as immigrants minus emigrants, for
municipality c at time t,XTct is municipality characteristics at time t, ct is the
error component and αc is a vector of unobserved municipality specific factors.
Unobserved factors which affect outcome are bad news for estimations because
of the bias omitted variable cause. However, since there exist no time subscript
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on αc, the problem can be solved using the fixed effects model (Verbeek, 2012).
In practice there are two methods, differencing and deviations from means.
Deviations from means get rid of αc by, as it says, subtracting the municipality
means from the observations,
Mct − (Mc) = αc − αc + (Xct −Xc)Tβ + ct − c (7)
And, since αc = αc the problem of unobserved fixed effects is gone. The
other method, differencing, takes the difference between time periods. When
dealing with data on more than two periods, the deviations from means (or
within) estimation is preferred (Angrist and Pischke, 2009 p. 224).
Nevertheless, when using aggregated data endogeneity problem may arise.
The error term captures the idiosyncratic variation in migration across munic-
ipalities and years. Municipality and time-specific shocks generate statistical
inference problems due to clustering. This would not be a problem if the shocks
are assumed to be independent across municipalities and time, but, as previ-
ously mentioned, I agree with Liebig and Schmidheiny and believe bad, or good,
things happen in one municipality, it is also more likely it happens in the next
year as well. For example, if some negative shock happens to Malmö in 1993 and
tax rate is needed to be risen, it is more likely the tax rate is high the following
year as well. This is called serial correlation in clustered panel data (Angrist and
Pischke, p. 318) and has been examined by Kézdi (2004) and Bertrand, Duflo
and Mullainathan (2004). When having a serial correlation problem standard
errors must be adjusted for the correlation within clusters. Liang and Zeger
(1986) suggest we cluster the standard errors by municipality, since it allows
for unrestricted residual correlation within clusters, thus, the serial correlation
problem is controlled for (Angrist and Pischke, p. 319).
However, Angrist and Pischke recommend at least 42 clusters in order to
avoid underestimate serial correlation and Moulton problem.3 They continue
by providing a list of solutions to the problem when the number of clusters
is less than 42, as in this study. These solutions are still under study and no
consensus has yet emerged of which is the most preferable; it all depends on the
3Moulton problem is correlation within a group, such as test scores and school classes. For
further explanation see Angrist and Pischke p. 308ff
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case. Luckily, this issue is less severe in the case of serial correlation. Hansen
(2007), in his study using data on Canada and the 10 provinces, found that the
method suggested by Liang and Zeger (1986) worked reasonably good even with
only 10 clusters.
To summarise so far, when dealing with panel data without data on indi-
vidual level, endogeneity and serial correlation problem arise. Schmidheiny and
Liebig recommend micro data, which Dahlberg et al uses. However, household-
level data is not always attainable. If using aggregated data, one could solve the
endogeneity and serial correlation problem by clustering the standard errors in
a fixed effect model. In this study, the number of clusters is 20, which would be
fine even if it is less than recommended 42. Expanding (6) we get
mct = ac + β1τct + β2τict + β3chct + β4edct + β5ect + β6oct+
+β7urct + β8popct + β9hpct + β10
20∑
j=1
dcτjt + ct (8)
Where the new variables are τict denotes tax index, urct is unemployment
rate, popct is population and hpct is house prices in municipality c and year t.
The interaction term dcτjt is the neighbouring municipalities’ tax rate, were dc
is a dummy and takes the value 1 if municipality j with τjt if it is a neighbour
to municipality c, and zero otherwise. As mentioned, some municipalities have
few neighbours and others have up to six, hence the summation sign.
An important remark has to be made. Transforming the variables into loga-
rithmic form give rise to sample selection problem. The variable Mct measures
the migration, hence, it takes negative values when emigration exceeds immigra-
tion. This becomes a problem because the logarithmic function does not work
mathematically with non-positive numbers, i.e. observations with negative Mct
either get ignored or treated as 0. Either way, this causes sample selection
problem. One solution to sample selection problem here is to use Tobit model,
which is preferable when the dependent variable either takes a continuous pos-
itive value or zero (for Mct < 0) (Verbeek, 2010). Another model which takes
this problem into account is the Heckman’s sample selection model (Heckman,
1979). Simply put, there is a second equation which relates to the regression
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of interest, where the underlying equation determines whether the dependent
variable is in the sample or not. In the context of this study, the underlying
equation determines if the migration is positive and thereby enables the trans-
formation into logarithmic form, thus, be included in the sample. Equation 9
illustrate:
ln(Mct) = X
T
ctβ + ct, if M > 0 in
Mct = X
T
ctβ + ct
(9)
In practice Heckman model comes in two versions, maximum likelihood and
a two-step estimator. In this study the two-step version is chosen, since it
is preferable when applying on large data set and it is more stable than the
ordinary maximum likelihood when the data are problematic (Johnsson, 2012).
However, the disadvantage of using two-step is that it does not support the
option of clustering the standard errors (STATA).
The drawbacks of using Tobit and Heckman model are that they do not
control for unobserved factors, which were discussed previously. Moreover, when
censoring the observations with negative migration lots of information is lost.
It seems to exist a trade-off, if using fixed effect estimator the variables cannot
be in logarithmic form, and by estimating with Tobit and Heckman model the
unobserved fixed effects are ignored and informative observations are censored.
Therefore, I will perform estimations using both models and analyse the results
in terms of their advantages and disadvantages.
5 Data
As mentioned in Introduction, the analysis is limited to the old Malmöhus region
with the municipalities Bjuv, Burlöv, Eslöv, Helsingborg, Höganäs, Hörby, Höör,
Kävlinge, Lomma, Lund, Malmö, Sjöbo, Skurup, Staffanstorp, Svalöv, Svedala,
Trelleborg, Vellinge and Ystad during the time period 1992-2012. All data are
obtained from Statistics Sweden and adjusted into 1992’s price level to avoid
disturbance by inflation. Due to limitations in access of data, this study includes
the aggregated migration of the municipality and not on individual level. This
may cause potential bias in the estimations since I cannot control for from where
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individuals move and therefore not isolate intra-regional migration. It means
that individuals who move to the region from outside the area are included in the
data set. Therefore the estimation will also catch regional differences, and not
only municipality preferences. However, since all municipalities in Malmöhus
region are assumed to be within a commutative distance, one can argue that
once an individual decides to move to the region, the municipality chosen as
residence location is assumed to be preferred over the others in the region.
Since the interest of this thesis is which municipality is the most preferred in
terms of tax rate, I choose to use the available data but keeping in mind the
potential problems that may arise when intra-regional migration is not isolated.
The municipality characteristics are summarised in table 1. Total number of
observations is 420, 20 municipalities during 21 years. In the top of the table the
dependent variable migration is summarised. Migration in this setting denotes
the difference between immigrants and emigrants during a year. During 1992-
2012 the 20 municipality have a mean migration of 269 persons per year. This
means, there have been a positive migration flow in the area of interest. The
standard deviation, 53.68, shows that the migration varies quite a lot among
municipalities and years. The municipality with the highest average migration
was, not surprisingly, Malmö. 2 222 more persons moved to Malmö than moved
out and in 2009 it was as many as 5 554 persons. Bjuv, on the other hand, has
the lowest average number of migration. However, the average migration is still
positive but small with a surplus of 3 persons. In 1997 the migration was at
its minimum, with -224, i.e. 224 more moved out of Bjuv than in. As a whole,
all the municipalities have experienced a positive inflow of migrants during the
time period.
In addition to total migration I will analyse the migration for those in age
less than 15, which is a proxy for families with children, and those in age more
than 64, which is a proxy for retirees. I do this in order to examine if there
are any differences in preferences between people in different life stages. The
migration and preferences of families are picked up by the migration of children,
since it is reasonable to assume children move together with their family and
not on their own (Grassmueck, 2011). Similar to total migration, the table
shows that the average migration for families is positive, which means the area
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has obtained a positive inflow of families during the time period. Looking at
the group within age > 64 the mean migration is less than the corresponding
number for both the total sample and for families (age < 15), but it is still
positive. In other words, a positive inflow of retirees has occurred in the area
as well.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: municipality characteristics (N = 420)
Variables Mean (S.D)
Migration, Total 268.77 (53.68)
Max 2 222.29 (351.03) Malmö
Min 3.05 (26.26) Bjuv
Migration, age < 15 (Families) 55.8 (120.73)
Migration, age > 64 (Retirees) 3.45 (34.37)
A.Tax rates
Municipal tax rates (percentage) 19.67 (0.21)
Tax index 10.00 (0.64)
Min 92.11 (0.44) Vellinge
Max 121.08 (5.32) Malmö
B.Expenditures
Total 1 391 022 664 (303546031)
Percentage of total expenditure devoted to:
Child care 15%
Education 32 %
Elderly care 28 %
Other purposes 25 %
C.Variables relevant for the empirical
analysis
Municipal tax rates (percentage) 19.67 (0.21)
Tax index 100.00 (0.64)
Education(per capita) 10270.39 (272.89)
Elderly care(per capita) 9135.59 (432.40)
Child care(per capita) 4922.15 (244.51)
Other purposes(per capita) 7839.31 (670.56)
House price 722.82 (10.91)
Population size 43243.21 (565.01)
Municipal unemployment (percentage of pop-
ulation age 18-65)
4.04 (0.26)
Note: House price, which is the average price of a sold house in a municipality,
is in 1000 SEK and adjusted into 1992 prices by a property price index. The
expenditures per capita are in 1992 prices and adjusted by CPI, consumer
price index.
Further, panel A summarises the tax variables. First, the average income
tax rate in this area is 19.7. I introduced a tax index, which shows the income
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tax rate in one municipality relative to the others. 100 is the average, and if the
tax rate in a municipality is greater than the mean, the corresponding tax index
exceeds 100. By symmetry, if the tax rate is less than average, then the index
is less than 100. Malmö is the municipality with the greatest index, 121, hence
has 20 % higher tax rate than average. Worth noting is the standard deviation,
5.32, which is high relative to the general tax index and Vellinge. This shows a
large variation in income tax rates in Malmö during the time period. Vellinge,
on the other hand, has both smaller standard deviation and tax index, 92, which
means the tax rate is 8 % less than average municipality. Income tax rate is
assumed to be a push factor, meaning, all else equal, people prefer to pay lower
taxes in order to attain higher disposable income.
Moving forward, panel B shows the expenditures. Total expenditure is 1 391
million SEK and by following Dahlberg et al, the expenditures are divided into
four categories. 15 % is devoted to child care, 32 % to education, 28 % to elderly
care and 25 % is devoted to other purposes, such as culture and social assistance.
Expenditures on public goods, such as parks and infrastructure, are included
in other purposes. Isolating the effect of public goods on migration is therefore
difficult. The reason to only include child care, education and elderly care and
disabled is because of data limitations, but also since the main responsibility of
a municipality is to provide child and elderly care and education (Dahlberg et al,
2012). In a Tiebout setting, expenditure variables act as pull factors. Ceteris
paribus, people prefer living in a community with greater public expenditure
(Grassmueck, 2011).
Panel C summarise the variables included in the empirical analysis. First
are the variables of special interest, tax rate and tax index. Second are the ex-
penditure variables, where education is the largest expenditure item with 10 270
SEK per capita on average. The largest variance is however for other purposes,
which reflects a large variation in expenditures which is not devoted to edu-
cation, child care, elderly care both within and across different municipalities.
The variable house price, 722 821 SEK, is the average price of a sold house in
this area, adjusted into 1992’s price level. There has been an extensive discus-
sion whether the property tax is fully captured in the property value (Cebula,
1978; Oates, 1969; Edel and Sclar, 1974). If that is the case, then house prices
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should not have an effect on municipality decision. However, since property tax
is not decided on municipality or state level in Sweden, in contrast to the US, I
follow Dahlberg et al and include house prices in my empirical model as a con-
trol variable. The house price variable is more difficult to categorise as a push
or pull factor. Obviously, if it is more costly to buy a house in one municipal-
ity, that municipality is less attractive, ceteris paribus. This however, relies on
the assumption of measuring all regional amenities, which is not very realistic
(Dahlberg et al, 2012 p.325). Additionally, if the municipality characteristics
are capitalised into house prices, which have been extensively discussed, the in-
terpretation is ambiguous and categorisation as push and pull factor is difficult
to predetermine. There are large differences in population size between the mu-
nicipalities, for example is the population size in Malmö 20 times bigger than
in Svalöv. One can therefore argue population size is a relevant control variable
because the largest municipality will have the greatest share of immigrants by
construction (Dahlberg et al).
Last, there is the unemployment variable. During the years 1992-2012 the
method of measuring unemployment has changed, and to avoid disturbance I
chose to only include those who were openly unemployed and ignore students
and people in various unemployment programs. The average rate in the area
during the time period was 4 % of the population in age 18-65. Including the
unemployment variable should not be necessary if the assumption of the area
being one single local labour market, however, it is included because of other
reasons. People may not want to live in a municipality with high unemployment
due to individual preferences. For example, an individual may not want to live
in an area with high unemployment because of preconceptions that there would
be an increase in tax rate or higher criminality. Thus, unemployment is assumed
to be push factor.
Additional to the variables in table 1, the empirical model will include tax
rate in neighbouring municipalities. Tax rates of neighbours are included in the
model in order to examine whether the surrounding municipalities’ rates affect
the choice of one particular municipality over the neighbouring. The numbers of
neighbouring municipalities differ, and table 2 shows the relations. For example,
Lund is surrounded by six municipalities, and Höganäs has only one neighbour.
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In the econometric model the tax rate of all the neighbouring municipalities
will be included, hence, for Lund there will be six neighbour tax rates and for
Höganäs only one.
Table 2: Neighbouring municipalities
Municipality Neighbours
Svalöv Bjuv Helsingborg Landskrona Eslöv Kävlinge
Staffanstorp Burlöv Lomma Lund Malmö Svedala
Burlöv Malmö Lomma Staffanstorp
Vellinge Malmö Svedala Trelleborg
Bjuv Helsingborg Svalöv
Kävlinge Landskrona Lund Lomma Eslöv Svalöv
Lomma Burlöv Staffanstorp Lund Kävlinge
Svedala Skurup Trelleborg Vellinge Malmö Staffanstorp Lund
Skurup Ystad Sjöbo Lund Svedala Trelleborg
Sjöbo Ystad Skurup Lund Eslöv Hörby
Hörby Eslöv Höör Sjöbo
Höör Hörby Eslöv
Malmö Burlöv Vellinge Svedala Staffanstorp
Lund Staffanstorp Lomma Eslöv Sjöbo Skurup Svedala
Landskrona Helsingborg Kävlinge Svalöv
Helsingborg Höganäs Bjuv Landskrona Svalöv
Höganäs Helsingborg
Eslöv Lund Kävlinge Svalöv Höör Hörby
Ystad Skurup Sjöbo
Trelleborg Vellinge Svedala Skurup
18
6 Results
In this section the estimations will be analysed. There will be three groups
analysed, group one is the total sample, group two is migrants age less than
15 (henceforth referred to as families) and the third is age over 64 (referred to
as retirees). The first part presents the results for the whole time period, both
with and without neighbours. The second part focuses on the migration patterns
after the new millennium and the installation of the bridge between Sweden and
Denmark, Öresundsbron. In the following part some variables are modified and
additional estimations are offered. The fourth and last part analyses the results
in terms of the theory discussed in earlier section.
6.1 Part one- Results of time period 1992-2012
Table 3 provides an overview of the main results from the four models, which
only includes the estimates on the total sample. Column 1 and 2 are estimates
from OLS, 3 and 4 from fixed effects, 5 and 6 from Tobit, 7 and 8 are the
Heckman’s estimates. 2, 4, 6 and 8 are the results from estimations including
neighbours. More detailed tables including estimates for families and retirees
are found in appendix.
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In table 3 column one the baseline results from OLS estimation are shown.
Including the whole sample, both the tax rate and tax index are significant at the
1 % significance level with ordinary standard errors. However, considering the
clustered the significance for tax rate coefficient is 5 % instead, which I consider
as an acceptable level. The baseline results imply that there is a positive relation
between tax rate and migration, i.e, if the tax were raised with one percentage
point the migration increase by 226 persons. On the other hand, the tax index
suggests that there is a negative relation between migration and relative tax
rate. If the municipality’s tax rate were to be one per cent higher than the
average in the area, the migration will decrease by 60 persons. Worth noting is
that none of the expenditure variables are significant in this baseline estimation,
but unemployment rate is. It works as a push factor; it is less attractive to live
in an area with high unemployment.
In column two and three in table 5, found in appendix, the baseline estima-
tions on families and retirees are shown. There is no significance for the tax rate
variable for families, but for the retirees the tax rate deters them from moving
into a municipality. The tax index however works as a pull factor for both
groups, but less severe for the retirees. Further, house prices do not seem to de-
ter these groups to migrate and expenditures do not seem to have an impact on
families. Retirees on the other hand are affected by the expenditures on elderly
care in a positive way, and in a negative way when considering expenditures on
education.
Moving forward, the FE estimations are shown in the right part of the table.
The tax variables are not different in terms of signs, but diverge in magnitude.
It appears OLS overestimates the effect of tax rate and tax index of the total
sample, which is quite common when comparing these two models (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009). This because OLS estimates over all variation and does not
take municipality fixed effects into account. Instead of 226 the coefficient for
tax rate in the FE model is 181, which correspond to a positive migration of 181
persons if the tax rate were raise by one percentage. For retirees, the migration
decrease with 8. When looking at R2 of the two models, the OLS seems to
fit the data best. Even though the OLS provides the highest R2, I believe the
results provided by FE are more close to the true values due to the assumptions
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and the characteristics of the FE model discussed in previous section.
In table 6 (appendix) the tax rates of the neighbouring municipalities are
included. Beginning with the left part, the OLS estimation provides similar
results for the tax variables as in table 5. New in table 6 is the significance level
of tax rate for families. As before, in total there is a positive relation between
tax rate and migration, while for both families and retirees the relationship
is negative. For the variable tax index, it is the opposite; for families and
retirees tax index has a positive impact on migration while in total it is negative.
Considering unemployment rate and house prices, both work as a push factor for
total sample while for families house prices work in divergent way. For retirees
house prices and unemployment are not significant if applying clustered standard
errors. As in previous table, the expenditure variables are only significant for
retirees.
Further, the table includes the names of all municipalities, as in the quality of
being a neighbouring municipality. The coefficient should be interpreted as how
the municipality tax rate affects the neighbours’ migration. For example, the
coefficient for Burlöv for families is -11 and interprets as reduction of migration
for the neighbouring municipalities, i.e Malmö, Lomma and Staffanstorp, with
11 if the tax rate in Burlöv increases by one percentage point. Worth noting is
that none of the neighbours are significant in column one and families seem to
be most sensitive to tax rates of the neighbouring communities.
In the right part the FE estimates are presented. As before, looking at the
tax variables the results differs slightly from the OLS estimates in level, but not
in sign. When including neighbours the magnitude of tax rate has increased to
193 and the tax index has decreased to -61, both with 5 % significance consid-
ering the clustered standard errors. For those age < 15 and >64, the patters
are similar to table 3. For families, the tax index coefficient is significant on a
1 % level while the coefficient for tax rate is insignificant. However, for retirees
both variables are significant. Interestingly, in the fixed effect model the vari-
able house prices is only significant for retirees, and opposite to OLS, it affects
migration in a negative way. When it comes to the expenditure variables, child
care, education and elderly care are significant for the total sample (with clus-
ters), but not for the other two groups. Worth noting, child care and education
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expenditures have a negative impact on residence location choice, which is the
opposite of what to expect.
Moving forward, similar to the estimations provided by OLS, the neighbour-
ing municipalities in the right panel have less impact on total than on families
and retirees. Also, the same municipalities have statistical significance for fami-
lies in both the models with only slightly difference in magnitude. For example,
Helsingborg has in OLS -6.5 and -6.4 in FE for families, which correspond to
a 7 and 6 (since there can be no half child) child reduction in migration for
the municipalities Höganäs, Bjuv, Landskrona and Svalöv if Helsingborg raises
the tax rate with one percentage. When looking at R2, table 4 provides similar
values as previous table with OLS having the highest. Notable is the value for
retirees, which is much smaller than for the other two groups but the model
including neighbours giving a better fit, 38 % and 21 % compared to 29 % and
15 %.
Table 5 and 6 presented estimations on non-transformed variables. To handle
the sample selection problem which arises when transforming into logarithmic
form, the Tobit and Heckman models are used instead. Table 7 (appendix)
shows the results from the estimations without neighbours. First, in the left
part, the estimates of tax variables provided by Tobit confirm previous results.
In column one, tax rate has a positive impact and tax index has the opposite.
Since the variables are in different functional form, comparison on magnitude
level is not appropriate. Sign however, are still comparable. As before, families
seem not to care of taxes but retirees do. Higher tax rates seem to deter people
age > 64. Different to table 5 and 6, which showed the results provided by OLS
and FE, the Tobit model shows that family migration is negatively affected by
high unemployment. This is not surprising, since it could be expected that
unemployment rate works as a push factor. What is surprising though is that
high spending on child care is negative for families on a 5 and 10 % significance
level, depending on which standard errors are applied. As in previous table,
education has negative impact for total and retirees, while the impact of elderly
care expenditures is positive.
In the right part of the table Heckman’s two-step estimations are presented.
For total age, the results are similar to what has already been shown. For age
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< 15 and > 64 there are no significance in tax variables, except for tax index
with 10 % significance concerning retirees. In opposite what has earlier been
shown, the variable population has a positive impact on migration for families
as well. The expenditure variables are only significant for total age, while child
care (as before) is negative and other expenditures have a positive coefficient.
Focusing on the bottom of the table, the log-L and the LR-test suggest that,
for both models, the hypothesis of all coefficients being zero can be rejected.
In table 8 neighbours are included. Estimations provided by the Tobit model
are more or less the same when it comes to tax variables; they are significant
for total age with tax rate having positive impact on migration and tax index a
negative, no significance for families and for retirees there is a negative relation
between tax rate and migration. The house prices variable is still only significant
for age < 15 while unemployment no longer is. Moving to the expenditures, as
before, child care has a negative coefficient as well as education in column one.
For retirees, the sign for education expenditure is the same and the coefficient
for other expenditures is negative as well, while it is positive for elderly care.
The results are not shocking, since it could be expected individuals older than
64 naturally prefer expenditures which they gain, or will be gaining from. As
in table 7, the estimates imply families are more sensitive to neighbouring tax
rates in the residence location decision. Out of the 20 municipalities, 13 have
significant coefficients for families while the corresponding number for total is
3. Interestingly, the big municipalities Malmö, Lund and Helsingborg all have
negative impact on their neighbour’s migration, while smaller communities like
Skurup, Staffanstorp and Svalöv have a positive impact on neighbouring migra-
tion. One interpretation could be that migration to small municipalities, which
are neighbours to larger ones, are more sensitive to a raise in tax rate.
In the right part of the table the tax variables are only significant for total
age, with only a slight difference in magnitude from the table without neigh-
bours. As before, the only significant expenditure variables are child care and
other purposes, where the coefficients still are negative respectively positive.
The observation of families being more sensitive to tax rate of neighbouring
municipalities is confirmed by the Heckman estimates, were age < 15 has 15
significant neighbours while total age has 3. The pattern of large communities
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having negative impact on smaller neighbours and smaller municipalities has
a positive on large neighbours are confirmed by the estimates provided by the
Heckman model.
Summing up so far, there are no major differences between OLS, FE, Tobit
and Heckman when it comes to sign of tax variables for total age. There is how-
ever some differences in significance when it comes to families and retirees, but
overall the models provide similar results. Most surprisingly, the variable child
care expenditures is negative in its coefficient in most estimations, those which
provide significant results at least. The coefficient for education expenditures is
also a bit surprising; when it is significant it takes a negative value. One could
expect that both child care and education would be negative for retirees, but
positive for families. However, these estimates in this study show that the ex-
penditures do not have a positive impact on families’ residence location choice.
Following Dahlberg et al and assuming that there exists a correlation between
quality and expenditure level, the results suggest that municipalities that offer
child care and education with higher quality do not attract families. What does
affect migration is relative tax level, which is supported by the results obtained
from OLS and FE. All four models show that families are more sensitive to tax
rate in neighbouring communities.
6.2 Part two- Results of time period 2000-2012
In this section the time period is narrowed to the years 2000-2012 in order to
evaluate whether there are any different patterns in the new millennium and
after the bridge opened. As in the previous section, the tables referred to are
found in appendix.
Table 9 in appendix shows the results from OLS and FE estimations, ex-
cluding neighbours. The variables of interest, the tax variables, lack significance
both among the two models and the three groups. For total age, it is only the
variables population and unemployment rate that are significant, but if apply-
ing clustered standard errors it is only the population variable. For families, in
excess of the variables mentioned the coefficient for house prices is also signifi-
cant. House prices do not seem to deter migration. Both OLS and FE provide
a negative coefficient for population, which is similar to what was seen in table
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5 and 6. As for the time period 1992-2012, the variable child care expenditures
is surprisingly negative for families. The same is for expenditures on education,
but the clustered standard errors do not provide significance and the negative
coefficient might not be correct. For retirees there are no major differences from
earlier estimations, worth noting though is that the FE provides a positive co-
efficient for unemployment where the OLS estimates a negative. However, the
clusters suggest that it is not significant. Also, expenditures on other purposes
have a positive coefficient, which differs from the Tobit estimates in previous
section.
In table 10(appendix) the results from OLS and FE estimations including
neighbours are shown. As without neighbours, the tax variables do not provide
any significant coefficients. Neither does the variable house prices, but unem-
ployment rate is still significant in the FE for total age. The FE estimation
does also provide significance in the population variable among all three groups,
where in OLS it is only significant for total age. Among the expenditure vari-
ables, they are only significant for retirees. In OLS the education expenditures
variable has a negative coefficient while elderly care has a positive, similar to
what was found in previous section. The results from the FE estimation imply,
instead, that other expenditures have a positive impact on migration. As be-
fore, families are most sensitive to neighbours’ tax rate, but now the number of
significant neighbours for total age exceeds the corresponding number for the
time period 1999-2012. For OLS the number is 8 and for FE 11, compared to 1
and 6 in table 6.
Comparing R2 between tables 9 and 10 it is shown that including neighbours
has a positive impact, especially for families in the FE model. In table 9(which
presented the estimations excluding neighbours) R2 is 7 %, compared to 69 %
in table 10(including neighbours). This suggests neighbours should be included
in the model.
Moving forward, the estimations on transformed variables are presented in
table 11 (appendix). The results from the Tobit model provide significant coef-
ficients for the tax variables, as opposed to the OLS and FE estimates in tables
9 and 10. For total age, the tax rate coefficient is positive and takes a value
which is approximately twice as large as in table 7(which presented the tobit and
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Heckman estimations on the whole time period). It suggests people during this
twelve year period are more sensitive to tax rate, which the tax index coefficient
supports with a value twice as large as in section 1992-2012. For families and
retirees the significance is less, notable however is that the signs have changed.
In table 11 the tax rate coefficients are positive while in table 7 the coefficient
was negative for retirees. The control variables house prices and unemployment
rate affect the migration in the same way as before, and so do expenditures. The
coefficients for child care expenditures are still negative, while elderly care for
retirees is positive. In the right part, the Heckman estimates lack significance in
the tax variables. The variables population and other expenditures are the only
significant for total age, while for families it is only population and for retirees
it is house prices. The variables which are significant, do not distinguish from
previous results in any great matter.
In the next table, table 12 in appendix, neighbours are included. The tobit
estimates now only provide significant values in tax variables for total age, not
for families and retirees. The magnitudes of the coefficients are still approxi-
mately twice as big as in table 8(where the tobit and Heckman estimates for the
whole time period are presented). Looking at the neighbours, similar to table
8, the group families is more sensitive to tax rate in neighbouring municipalities
which now have 16 significant coefficients compared to 15 in previous section.
The pattern described before, i.e large communities have negative coefficient
and smaller with large neighbour have a positive coefficient, are repeated in this
table. For retirees, there are no surprises. The variables unemployment rate
and education expenditure are negative, population and elderly care are posi-
tive and some of the neighbours are significant. As in table 11, there are few
significant variables estimated by the Heckman model. However, there is signif-
icance among the neighbours especially for families. As been observed before,
yet worth to be emphasised, the estimates from Heckman confirm the results
of tax rate in neighbouring municipalities affect migration when it comes to
families.
These four tables have shown results from estimating the effects on migration
during the time period 2000-2012. Three out of four models lack significance
in the variables of interest. The Tobit model however provides estimations
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which show that, during these years, people were more sensitive to tax rate and
tax index. All four models cohesively show that neighbouring tax rates affect
families in their residence location choice more than the other groups. The
other variables, such as expenditures and house prices, affect the migration in
the same way as in previous section.
6.3 Further analysis with modified variables
This sub-section will further examine the relation between income tax rates and
migration as some modifications of the initial model and its variables will be
analysed. Taking the results from previous section in to account, from now on I
will only apply the FE and tobit model with clustered standard errors. The FE
is preferred over OLS because of the unobserved municipality specific factors
and tobit is preferred over Heckman since clustering the standard errors are
allowed.
When considering where to live, one could argue that it is the expenditures
and tax rates of the previous year individuals take into account and not the
current year. However, the result from the estimation including lags does not
provide any new information and does not differ from the results in previous
section. Therefore the result will not be presented since it does not contribute
to the analysis. The result from an estimation with migration as a fraction of
the population as the dependent variable, instead of raw migration, does not
either provide any new information that contributes to the analysis, and for the
same reasons as before the result will not be presented in this paper.
Instead of defining the expenditure variables as expenditure per capita, as
in previous sections, I redefine it as expenditures per user. This is done by
assuming child care is used by children in age 0-6, education is used by children
aged 7-15 and elderly care 65+, where the statistics of users are provided by
SCB (Dahberg et al).
The main results can be seen in table 4, which only presents the results of
the total sample, while the rest of the tables that I will refer to are found in
appendix. In table 4, column 1 and 2 are the results from the fixed effect model
and 3 and 4 are from the Tobit model, 1 and 3 are without neighbours while 2
and 4 include neighbours.
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Table 4: Overview of FE and Tobit, including expenditures/user,
clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** denotes 1% signifi-
cance, ** 5% and * 10% significance. (N = 420)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax rate 203.762** 210.425* 2.043*** 1.894***
(92.993) (100.805) (0.266) (0.261)
Tax index -49.820** -60.956** -0.392*** -0.363***
(21.533) (25.024) (0.053) (0.052)
Expenditure variables
Child care -0.009* -0.008 -0.825 -0.857
(0.004) (0.005) (1.040) (0.998)
Education -0.003** -0.004*** -2.327*** -2.147***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.802) (0.773)
Elderly care 0.008** 0.011** -0.813 -0.249
(0.003) (0.003) (0.893) (0.874)
Other -0.005 -0.013* 1.357** 1.151**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.587) (0.568)
Control variables
House prices 0.239 0.119 -0.613 -1.068*
(0.288) (0.263) (0.551) (0.545)
Unemployment rate -81.418*** -73.739*** -0.895*** -0.789***
(15.605) (14.795) (0.115) (0.113)
Population 0.027*** 0.024*** 1.849*** 1.765***
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.008) (0.008) (0.270) (0.280)
Intercept 540.654 1894.842 23.743** 21.095**
(791.227) (1114.463) (10.720) (10.636)
Neighbours No Yes No Yes
Logarithmic form No No Yes Yes
R2 0.421 0.479 - -
As with expenditures per capita, the tax rate variable has a positive impact
on migration while tax index has a negative, nothing new there. For the ex-
penditures, as before the coefficient for child care is not significant on a 5 %
significance level. For education the coefficients are significantly negative in all
four specifications. For elderly care, the fixed effect provides a 5 % significant
positive coefficient, while in the Tobit model it lacks significance. The opposite
can be seen for other expenditures, the results from the Tobit model show a
positive effect while it lacks significance in the FE model.
For the groups families and retirees, the results can be seen in tables 13
and 14. The results concerning the tax variables are somewhat the same as in
previous sections. Focusing on the expenditures, including child care per user
instead of per capita does not change the results and the coefficients are still not
significant. Education expenditure per user does not either provide any signifi-
cant coefficients for families, while it does for retirees. However, the coefficient
is 0 and tells us that it is not an important factor for individuals aged > 64,
which is quite intuitive. In opposite of what could be seen in previous section
expenditures on elderly care are not significant for retirees in these estimations.
For families however the Tobit model shows that expenditures on elderly care
have a negative impact on migration. Expenditures on other purposes, such as
public goods, do not provide any significant coefficients for families while for
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retirees the effect is a negative.
The next modification is in the tax variable. Instead of regressing on tax
rate as level, tables 15 and 16 in appendix show the results from estimations
including the change in tax rate, delta tax rate. In both tables the FE provides
negative coefficients on a 1 % significance level for all three groups. These
results show that an increase in tax rate deter migrants in all groups, which
was not the case in previous estimations. On the other hand, an increase in
tax index now attracts families and retirees in the FE model. Looking at the
Tobit estimates, the coefficient of tax index for retirees is still negative. Another
interesting result is that the Tobit estimate for child care expenditures per user
now provides a positive coefficient on a 1 % significance level, which contradicts
some of the earlier results.
A brief look at the neighbours in the tables 14 and 16 confirm earlier re-
sults; in general large municipalities have a negative coefficient while smaller
neighbours have a positive. As before, this suggests that it exists a difference
in sensitivity among the municipalities which give rise to tax competition. This
will be further discussed in following sections.
6.4 Results in a Tiebout framework
In section Data the variables were intuitively categorised into push and pull
factors. Tax rate was assumed to, ceteris paribus, deter migrants. However,
the results show that for the sample as a whole it rather attracts residents. For
families it does not seem to be an important variable, since it lacks significance
in most of the estimations. The retirees however, were deterred by tax rate.
When looking at the effect of changes in tax rates (delta tax rate) instead the
estimates provide cohesive results for all groups, which show that changes in
tax rates deter migrants. Relative tax, or as in the regressions, tax index,
affects the groups in different way. For the total group, a high tax relative
to other municipalities acts as a push factor. This result supports the theory
and previous research (Grassmueck, 2011). Further, house prices do not seem
to deter migrants while unemployment rates do, which are similar to findings
by Dahlberg et al (2012). Either the assumption of the study is wrong, which
means that old Malmöhus cannot be seen as one single job market, or, people
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prefer to avoid areas with high unemployment due to other reasons.
As were discussed in the sections Theory and Data, the expenditure vari-
ables could be expected to act as pull factors. Nevertheless, the results from
previous sections show that child care and education expenditures actually work
in the other way. One could expect retirees to have these preferences, which
the estimates confirm, but families are assumed to prefer education and child
care. The tables show however that this is not the case, either the variables
are not significant or they are negative. These findings do not only contradict
theory, but also previous research (Dahlberg et al). The explanation may be
that the model providing these negative coefficients is not correctly specified
for data restricted to families. However, when modifying the model to include
expenditures per user and delta tax rate, child care expenditures were estimated
to have a positive impact on total migration.
Comparing the results from the estimations on the narrowed time period
2000-2012 and the whole period 1992-2012, there were only significant values
from the Tobit estimation. Those results showed that tax rate and tax index
were twice as high during the last twelve years, and implicated that it has
become a more important variable to consider when choosing residence location.
However, since no other model confirms the findings, conclusions should be
carefully made.
Moving forward, when the neighbours were included the models seemed to
fit the data better, especially for families, where the R2 value increased the
most. Interestingly, a pattern could be seen. Large municipalities affect their
smaller neighbours’ migration in a negative way, while the tax rate of the smaller
communities affect the large neighbour in a positive way. For example, if Svedala
were supposed to raise taxes the number of migrants to Malmö would increase,
without any changes in the Malmö variables. This is an important result, which
suggests smaller municipalities should be more careful with raising taxes than
larger need to be. This result is what could be expected from tax competition
theory. In a tax competition context, larger municipalities can set a higher tax
while smaller must offer a lower tax in order to continue to be competitive.4
The assumptions of the Tiebout hypothesis were described in section The-
4See for example Oates (1972), Wilson (1999) and Junevičius and Šniukštaité (2009) for
theoretical discussion.
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ory. The assumption of there being sufficient amount of communities is difficult
to evaluate out of the estimations made. Further, as already been touched,
the assumption of all communities offer all employment possibilities can be dis-
cussed. This study assumes that the old Malmöhus region is one single job
market, hence, all municipalities are able to offer all employment prospects in
the region. The estimations do however provide information that employment
rate deter migration, which implies that individuals prefer a community with
low unemployment due to social preferences or the assumption does not hold. If
the assumption fails to hold, then municipalities which offer better employment
possibilities are more preferable than one that provides more attractive public
good expenditures. The model will be unable to estimate the true preferences
of local income taxation and public good expenditures and the results are mis-
leading. Next, Hindriks and Myles identified the assumption of the consumer
being able to freely choose among the communities as the most important one.
It needs the housing market to be efficient and accommodation possibilities to
not have an impact on which municipality to choose. Since the estimates only
control for house prices and not for accommodation possibilities it is difficult
to evaluate the validity of the assumption. However, since it exists transaction
costs, such as real estate agent fees, one can argue the assumption is not entirely
fulfilled.
Finally, a numerical example will illustrate the interpretation of the coeffi-
cients for tax rate and tax index. I choose to apply the values estimated by
FE in table 6 because of the econometric discussion in section Model and the
straightforward interpretation it provides comparing to Tobit and Heckman.
The coefficient for tax rate predicts an increase in migrants if the tax rate is
raised. However, the tax index predict a decrease if the change in tax rate affect
the relation to average tax rate. These two forces work against each other. Let’s
assume the politicians in Vellinge, the municipality with the lowest tax rate in
2012, decide to raise the tax rate with the standard deviation, 0.214. The new
tax rate is then 18.71. Everything else equal, this leads to an increase in mi-
grants with 41 persons. However, since the new tax rate relates differently with
all other municipalities, the effect by tax index decrease the migration with 61
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persons.5 In total, the tax raise leads to a 20 person decrease of migrants.
This numerical example together with the results from the estimations in-
cluding delta tax rate show that taxes do act as determent, since the effect from
relative tax exceeds the positive effect of tax rate, hence, the results supports
theory and previous research.
7 Concluding remarks
In this study I have examined the impact of tax rate and public expenditures on
residence location choice. The analysis has been limited to old Malmöhus region
during the time period 1992-2012. I found that tax rate does not deter migrants
while high tax rate relative to other municipalities in the area do. Considering
retirees, the results were quite the opposite. Most of the estimations provided
a negative tax rate coefficient which implies retirees are more sensitive to high
tax rates in their decision where to live. Families however, or families in reality,
seem not to care about tax rate at its absolute value, but in relative terms high
tax actually attracts migrants. When modifying the model to include changes
in tax rate and expenditures per user instead the estimation provided cohesive
results. All three groups were negatively affected by a positive change in tax
rate.
Focusing on the local public goods provided, Dahlberg et al (2012) found
that expenditures on child care attract migrants, but this analysis provides
mixed results. In most of the estimations child care expenditure actually deter
migrants, but when modifying the variables to expenditures per user instead of
per capita, expenditures on child care has a positive impact on migration. The
results are less significant when it comes to education, elderly care and other
expenditures, but for the older migrants, the retirees, expenditure on elderly
care attracts while public spending on education deters.
This essay also studied the effect of neighbouring municipalities on residence
location choice. This was done by including the tax rate of neighbours in the
regressions. It was shown that the group families was most sensitive and that
took this aspect into account when deciding where to live. The analysis did also
5New tax index is 93.05 instead of 92.04 lead to a decrease of 61 since −60.70 ∗ (93.05 −
92.04) = 61.46
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show a pattern of the tax rate in large municipalities affecting the migration
into smaller neighbours in a negative way, and correspondingly, the tax rate in
small municipalities affect the migration of a large neighbour positively. This
result gives rise to a tax competition issue, where smaller municipalities are more
sensitive to local income taxation than their larger neighbour. Therefore, for
further research I purpose that a tax competition aspect should be incorporated
in the model.
Although the results show that migrants did not find high tax rate as a
deterrent, when considering the tax rate in relation to the others a higher tax
rate than average in the area do work as a determent. This finding, together
with the impact of the tax rate of neighbouring municipalities, contributes to
the existing research on the topic. In excess of tax rate not necessarily being a
deterrent, as was shown by Oates (1969) and Knapp, White, and Clark (2001),
this study also suggest the relative tax rate is an important variable in the
residence decision. It shows the importance of knowing what the neighbours
do, because changes in the tax rate of other municipalities affect the migration.
When narrowing the time period to 2000-2012, the results were less con-
clusive. Out of the four estimation methods it was only Tobit that provided
significant coefficients. The results suggested that the tax variables have been
twice as important during the time period, and for families tax index changed
sign from positive to negative. For all three groups the relative tax deterred
migration. Since these results could not be confirmed by the other models,
conclusions should be made with caution.
The study relies on the assumptions of an efficient housing market and of
the area being one single job market. Transaction costs in the housing market
and accommodation possibilities were not controlled for, while unemployment
was. The estimations provided a significant negative coefficient which implies
people avoid municipalities with high unemployment. Reasons for this can be
further discussed in terms of preferences, but if believing that people choose one
municipality over another because of employment prospects and not due to a
more attractive public good bundle, then this study and its results fail.
One limitation of this study has been the aggregated data. In the perfect of
worlds, data on individual level would be available and it could be possible to
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control for intra-area migration. It would also be possible to analyse whether
differences in educational level have impact on residence location choice. How-
ever, individual data was not available to me and this study. In order to control
for endogeneity problem inherited in aggregated data I followed Grassmueck
(2011) and cluster-correct the standard errors. The correction did not affect the
interpretation to a large extent, it changed significance in some variables but
overall the ordinary and the clustered standard errors provided quite similar
results.
It was discussed there would exist a trade–off between the methods using
non-transformed data, OLS and FE, and those using data in logarithmic form,
Tobit and Heckman. The results showed however the coefficients estimated were
similar in signs. The estimations from FE were chosen when estimating the
total effect of a tax raise, including both tax rate and tax index, because of its
straightforward interpretation of coefficients and that it controls for unobserved
municipality fixed effects. In this study, and for that purpose, the FE estimator
was therefore the most preferable even though OLS had a greater R2 value. One
could argue the logarithmic form is the most realistic, and therefore preferable,
but due to the data set including negative values of migration a transformation
created sample selection problem. By using the Tobit and Heckman models
the sample selection problem was handled, but important information was lost.
Since the results did not differ in any great manner, I believe the FE estimator
was preferable in this case.
The study provided two important results. First, tax rate by itself does not
deter people from choosing a municipality as their residence location. Second,
the tax rate relative to other municipalities’ in the same area is an important
factor. It has been shown that a high tax rate relative to the average deters mi-
grants, and for smaller municipalities with a large neighbour, a raise in tax rate
will lead to a decrease in migration. Hence, for local politicians it is important
to know what their colleagues in other municipalities do.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Tables, part one
Table 5: OLS and FE 1992-2012, standard errors in parenthesis. c
stands for clustered standard errors, *** denotes 1% significance,
** 5% and * 10% significance. (N=420)
OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 225.631*** -2.842 -8.968*** 180.594*** -2.066 -7.579***
(37.011) (9.941) (3.092) (38.695) (9.528) (2.640)
(80.858)c** (9.369)c (2.824)c*** (77.689)c** (8.860)c (2.450)c***
Tax index -60.294*** 9.196*** 1.807*** -47.866*** 12.072*** 3.063***
(7.431) (1.996) (0.621) (8.840) (2.177) (0.603)
(19.374)c*** (3.662)c** (0.748)c** (18.670)c** (2.242)c*** (0.719)c***
House prices -0.295*** 0.260*** 0.044*** 0.036 0.095 -0.075***
(0.108) (0.290) (0.009) (0.366) (0.090) (0.025)
(0.171)c (0.060)c*** (0.017)c** (0.296)c (0.079)c (0.028)c**
Unemployment -72.734*** -5.104 2.224* -69.829*** -4.777 2.345**
rate (15.846) (4.256) (1.324) (17.515) (4.313) (1.195)
(19.950)c*** (3.833)c (2.317)c (12.150)c*** (2.702)c (2.072)c
Population 0.011*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.030*** -0.003** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000)
(0.001)c*** (0.000)c*** (0.000)c** (0.007)c*** (0.002)c* (0.000)c*
Exp child care -0.029 -0.014** -0.000 -0.076* 0.013 0.003
(0.023) (0.006) (0.002) (0.040) (0.010) (0.003)
(0.024)c (0.010) (0.004)c (0.033)c** (0.010)c (0.003)c
Exp education -0.004 -0.006 -0.005*** -0.026 -0.006 0.001
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(0.016) (0.004) (0.001) (0.021) (0.005) (0.001)
(0.016)c (0.007)c (0.002)c** (0.013)c* (0.007)c (0.002)c
Exp elderly care -0.006 0.002 0.007*** 0.019 -0.003 -0.002
(0.013) (0.003) (0.001) (0.029) (0.007) (0.002)
(0.015)c (0.005)c (0.002)c*** (0.020)c (0.010)c (0.002)c
Exp other 0.009 0.002 -0.003*** 0.007 -0.001 0.000
(0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.003) (0.001)
(0.010)c (0.004)c (0.002)c* (0.008)c (0.003)c (0.001)c
Intercept 2086.232*** -791.749*** -12.024 885.778 -1009.644*** -178.642***
(323.397) (86.861) (27.015) (629.113) (154.906) (42.929)
(594.410)c*** (287.671)c** (56.136)c (823.447)c (217.476)c*** (78.956)c**
R2 0.695 0.409 0.294 0.408 0.478 0.149
F-test 103.72 31.48 18.98 29.97 39.81 7.63
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 6: OLS and FE 1992-2012 including neighbours, standard
errors in parenthesis. c stands for clustered standard errors, ***
denotes 1% significance, ** 5% and * 10% significance. (N=420)
OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 236.703*** -14.823** -10.972*** 192.655*** -6.845 -9.380***
(38.699) (6.837) (3.100) (39.142) (7.229) (2.711)
(92.343)c** (4.856)c*** (3.435)c*** (84.461)c** (5.388)c (2.660)c***
Tax index -65.098*** 7.458*** 1.639*** -60.704*** 6.410*** 3.071***
Continued on next page
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OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(7.787) (1.376) (0.624) (9.182) (1.700) (0.636)
(22.839)c*** (1.809)c*** (0.626)c** (21.797)c** (1.181)c*** (0.550)c***
House prices -0.444*** 0.092*** 0.025*** -0.107 0.062 -0.076***
(0.121) (0.021) (0.010) (0.370) (0.068) (0.025)
(0.225)c* (0.025)c*** (0.018)c (0.296)c (0.062)c (0.030)c**
Unemployment -65.673*** 1.621 2.938** -63.398*** -1.034 2.803**
rate (16.235) (2.868) (1.301) (17.483) (3.229) (1.211)
(18.444)c*** (2.712)c (2.267)c (9.648)c*** (2.889)c (1.890)c
Population 0.011*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.027*** -0.004*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000)
(0.001)c*** (0.000)c*** (0.000)c (0.007)c*** (0.001)c*** (0.001)c**
Exp child care -0.025 -0.006 0.001 -0.097** 0.007 0.003
(0.024) (0.004) (0.002) (0.040) (0.007) (0.003)
(0.024)c (0.005)c (0.004)c (0.033)c*** (0.005)c (0.003)c
Exp education -0.004 -0.003 -0.005*** -0.029 -0.003 0.002
(0.017) (0.003) (0.001) (0.021) (0.004) (0.001)
(0.020)c (0.003)c (0.002)c** (0.013)c** (0.002)c (0.002)c
Exp elderly care -0.007 0.003 0.007*** 0.037 -0.001 -0.003
(0.013) (0.002) (0.001) (10.029) (0.005) (0.002)
(0.016)c (0.003)c (0.002)c*** (0.017)c** (0.003)c (0.002)c
Exp other 0.008 0.000 -0.004*** 0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.002) (0.001)
(0.011)c (0.002)c (0.002)c** (0.008)c (0.001)c (0.001)c
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OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Svalöv 8.913 2.501 0.731 10.196 2.342 0.302
(11.211) (1.980) (0.898) (10.238) (1.891) (0.709)
(11.129)c (1.759)c (0.433)c (10.293)c (1.652)c (0.417)c
Staffanstorp -0.420 0.619 -0.092 -1.704 0.691 0.307
(4.508) (0.796) (0.361) (4.134) (0.763) (0.286)
(2.813)c (0.398)c (0.261)c (1.818)c (0.327)c** (0.253)c
Burlöv -7.844 -10.772*** -0.872 -15.041 -10.172*** -1.053
(10.121) (1.788) (0.811) (9.320) (1.721) (0.646)
(6.888)c (1.366)c*** (0.871)c (8.117)c* (1.305)c*** (0.816)c
Vellinge -7.583 -2.334 1.759 38.987 -5.017 -3.499
(87.436) (15.447) (7.004) (80.104) (14.793) (5.549)
(56.696)c (6.969)c (4.259)c (47.308)c (6.086)c (4.562)c
Bjuv 23.345 -8.086** -1.921 17.296 -6.004* -1.451
(20.116) (3.554) (1.611) (18.631) (3.441) (1.291)
(27.016)c (4.005)c* (2.217)c (20.473)c (2.367)c** (1.371)c
Kävlinge -4.609 -0.765 0.390 -4.715 -0.916 0.195
(3.812) (0.674) (0.305) (3.512) (0.648) (0.243)
(2.439)c* (0.390)c (0.237)c* (2.389)c* (0.394)c** (0.164)c
Lomma 0.814 -5.529 -3.815 -46.883 -2.595 1.255
(83.781) (14.801) (6.711) (76.818) (14.187) (5.321)
(53.697)c (7.514)c (4.188)c (46.372)c (6.394)c (4.579)c
Svedala 4.590 5.521*** 0.713 8.945* 4.893*** 0.641*
(5.498) (0.971) (0.440) (5.000) (0.923) (0.346)
(3.265)c (0.764)c*** (0.373)c* (3.600)c** (0.719)c*** (0.410)c
Continued on next page
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OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Skurup 2.349 -0.162 0.150 0.824 -0.170 -0.165
(4.741) (0.838) (0.380) (4.350) (0.803) (0.301)
(2.307)c (0.354)c (0.363)c (1.922)c (0.286)c (0. 331)c
Sjöbo -4.083 0.656 0.103 -1.023 -0.004 0.579*
(5.293) (0.935) (0.424) (4.018) (0.908) (0.341)
(4.616)c (0.571)c (0.399)c (3.765)c (0.531) (0.334)c
Hörby -6.019 -4.177*** -1.145* -8.564 -4.074*** -0.708
(7.607) (1.344) (0.609) (6.941) (1.281) (0.481)
(7.173)c (1.068)c*** (0.487)c** (7.775)c (1.128)c*** (0.390)c*
Höör -4.206 -4.140** -0.685 -8.256 -3.623** -0.941
(9.341) (1.651) (0.748) (8.480) (1.566) (0.587)
(5.097)c (0.981)c*** (0.482)c (4.422)c* (0.933)c*** (0.524)c
Malmö -4.741 -0.884 1.053 -4.417 -0.968 1.161**
(7.980) (1.410) (0.639) (7.251) (1.339) (0.502)
(3.412)c (0.757)c (0.400)c** (2.488)c* (0.708)c (0.512)c**
Lund 5.258 4.786*** 0.360 8.894 4.595*** 0.507
(7.317) (1.293) (0.586) (6.710) (1.239) (0.465)
(3.926)c (0.807)c*** (0.567)c (4.501)c* (0.709)c*** (0.493)c
Landskrona -11.422 -0.448 0.133 -11.619 -0.540 0.783
(13.212) (2.334) (1.058) (12.073) (2.230) (0.836)
(15.210)c (1.968)c (0.433)c (13.813)c (1.683)c (0.554)c
Helsingborg -13.462 -6.548*** -1.231 -17.712 -6.442*** -0.690
(12.087) (2.135) (0.968) (11.069) (2.044) (0.767)
Continued on next page
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OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(13.202)c (2.007)c*** (0.621)c* (12.789)c (1.941)c*** (0.575)c
Höganäs -29.061 3.093 1.075 -27.968 1.007 0.529
(20.574) (3.635) (1.648) (19.197) (3.545) (1.330)
(29.197)c (4.377)c (2.485)c (23.922)c (2.969)c (1.251)c
Eslöv 0.191 -1.547 0.517 -4.375 -1.209 0.449
(6.805) (1.202) (0.545) (6.234) (1.151) (0.432)
(4.677)c (0.718)c** (0.326)c (2.791)c (0.615)c* (0.282)c
Ystad -6.819 -5.987*** 0.696 -13.798* -5.374*** 0.409
(7.952) (1.405) (0.637) (7.500) (1.385) (0.520)
(5.048)c (1.023)c*** (0.721)c (3.641)c*** (0.782)c*** (0.535)c
Trelleborg -9.199 -10.991*** -2.422** -16.862 -10.184*** -2.457***
(13.769) (2.433) (1.103) (12.471) (2.303) (0.864)
(8.085)c (1.772)c*** (0.680)c*** (8.662)c (1.774)c*** (0.890)c**
Intercept 2541.908*** -297.003*** 46.414 2343.728*** -212.023* -148.677***
(370.476) (65.449) (29.677) (686.665) (126.811) (47.567)
(883.901)c*** (96.988)c*** (34.966)c (1148.747)c* (97.462)c** (53.332)c**
R2 0.707 0.755 0.377 0.468 0.736 0.211
F-test 32.50 41.36 8.15 11.24 35.65 3.43
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 7: Tobit and Heckman(twostep) model 1992-2012 without
neighbours, standard errors in parenthesis. c stands for clustered
standard errors, *** denotes 1% significance, ** 5% and * 10%
significance. (N=420)
Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 1.956*** 0.330* -0.751*** 0.914*** 0.008 0.219
(0.256) (0.168) (0.247) (0.263) (0.110) (0.146)
(0.458)c*** (0.257)c (0.301)c**
Tax index -0.378*** -0.023 0.074 -0.174*** 0.006 -0.055*
(0.052) (0.034) (0.051) (0.051) (0.020) (0.031)
(0. 096)c*** (0.068)c (0.054)c
Ln House prices 0.928 0.307*** 1.082* 0.347 0.811*** 0.518
(0.568) (0.387) (0.589) (0.288) (0.313) (0.358)
(0.858)c (0.795)c*** (0.993)c
Unemployment -0.872*** -0.179** -0.153 -0.341*** -0.115*** 0.015
rate (0.105) (0.070) (0.188) (0.111) (0.039) (0.064)
(0.166)c*** (0.072)c** (0.113)c
Ln Population 1.140*** -0.987*** 0.608** 0.930*** 0.476** 0.367**
(0.261) (0.181) (0.269) (0.132) (0.211) (0.165)
(0.458)c** (0.753)c (0.598)c
Ln Exp child -2.237*** -0.967** -0.915 -1.469*** 0.358 -0.444
care (0.710) (0.479) (0.734) (0.412) (0.269) (0.455)
(0.884)c** (0.572)c* (1.008)c
Ln Exp -3.774*** -0.818 -3.742*** -0.304 -0.234 -0.884
education (1.015) (0.683) (1.050) (0.758) (0.271) (0.660)
(0.893)c*** (1.237)c (1.150)c***
Continued on next page
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Ln Exp elderly 1.927** 0.802 4.319*** -0.005 -0.049 0.361
care (0.759) (0.509) (0.777) (0.478) (0.386) (0.466)
(1.242)c (0.919)c (1.462)c***
Ln Exp other 0.275 -0.392 -2.586*** 0.748** -0.508 0.108
(0.652) (0.441) (0.670) (0.334) (0.331) (0.399)
(1.185)c (0.932)c (0.939)c***
Intercept 22.543** 6.997 21.421* 2.370 -2.443 4.982
(10.576) (7.073) (11.030) (6.424) (3.963) (6.662)
(10.825)c** (10.589)c (10.828)c**
Log-L -831.312 -764.293 -651.188 - - -
LR-test 195.46 71.64 83.00 194.61 181.13 43.54
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 8: Tobit and Heckman(twostep) model 1992-2012 including
neighbours, standard errors in parenthesis. c stands for clustered
standard errors, *** denotes 1% significance, ** 5% and * 10%
significance. (N=420)
Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 1.846*** 0.002 -0.914*** 0.807*** -0.032 -0.080
(0.249) (0.040) (0.245) (0.251) (0.047) (0.320)
(0.483)c*** (0.047)c (0.296)c***
Tax index -0.354*** 0.004 0.093* -0.158*** 0.008 -0.011
(0.051) (0.008) (0.051) (0.049) (0.009) (0.043)
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(0.103)c*** (0.009)c (0.052)c*
Ln House prices 0.213 0.248*** 0.445 -0.099 0.170 0.721**
(0.572) (0.092) (0.599) (0.276) (0.134) (0.315)
(1.023)c (0.103)c** (0.859)c
Unemployment -0.780*** -0.004 -0.080 -0.266** -0.005 0.016
rate (0.102) (0.016) (0.106) (0.106) (0.017) (0.060)
(0.146)c*** (0.014)c (0.106)c
Ln Population 1.062*** 0.084* 0.892*** 0.911*** 0.203** 0.468**
(0.281) (0.047) (0.290) (0.132) (0.090)
(0.450)c** (0.061)c (0.376)c***
Ln Exp child -2.081*** 0.070 -0.646 -1.332*** 0.055 -0.352
care (0.694) (0.111) (0.725) (0.383) (0.118) (0.412)
(0.913)c** (0.084)c (0.898)c
Ln Exp -3.499*** 0.080 -3.083*** 0.210 0.129 -1.405*
education (0.979) (0.161) (1.013) (0.727) (0.166) (0.801)
(0.969)c*** (0.175)c (1.233)c***
Ln Exp elderly 1.829** 0.003 4.176*** -0.066 -0.131 1.228
care (0.737) (0.114) (0.760) (0.449) (0.141) (1.179)
(1.275)c (0.105)c (1.156)c***
Ln Exp other 0.247 -0.066 -2.431*** 0.728** 0.065 -0.535
(0.631) (0.101) (0.651) (0.308) (0.115) (0.705)
(1.150)c (0.077)c (0.940)c***
Svalöv -0.074 0.082*** -0.012 -0.011 0.098*** -0.021
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(0.083) (0.014) (0.080) (0.036) (0.013) (0.040)
(0.056)c (0.014)c*** (0.053)c
Staffanstorp 0.001 0.079*** 0.042 0.001 0.093*** -0.016
(0.030) (0.012) (0.030) (0.013) (0.011) (0.025)
(0.026)c (0.014)c*** (0.034)c
Burlöv -0.001 -0.094*** -0.086 -0.023 -0.118*** 0.024
(0.065) (0.016) (0.065) (0.029) (0.015) (0.051)
(0.062)c (0.017)c*** (0.073)c
Vellinge 1.007* -0.111 0.336 -0.020 0.082 -0.361
(0.571) (0.098) (0.586) (0.275) (0.095) (0.378)
(0.944)c (0.127)c (0.584)c
Bjuv -0.114 -0.235*** -0.215 -0.055 -0.031 0.023
(0.148) (0.038) (0.143) (0.064) (0.169) (0.105)
(0.086)c (0.017)c*** (0.096)c
Kävlinge -0.018 0.026*** 0.014 -0.011 0.025*** -0.001
(0.024) (0.005) (0.025) (0.011) (0.004) (0.014)
(0.027)c (0.009)c (0.021)c
Lomma -1.016* -0.051 -0.492 -0.039 -0.278*** 0.368
(0.547) (0.095) (0.562) (0.264) (0.093) (0.412)
(0.894)c (0.127)c (0.556)c
Svedala 0.030 0.013** 0.071* 0.032** 0.025*** -0.032
(0.036) (0.006) (0.037) (0.016) (0.005) (0.039)
(0.031)c (0.005)c*** (0.034)c*
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Skurup -0.011 0.034*** -0.016 0.018 0.020*** 0.009
(0.030) (0.006) (0.031) (0.013) (0.005) (0.018)
(0.028)c (0.005)c*** (0.041)c
Sjöbo 0.071** -0.006 0.049 0.012 0.008 -0.014
(0.035) (0.006) (0.036) (0.016) (0.005) (0.029)
(0.031)c** (0.005)c (0.034)c
Hörby 0.083 -0.022** -0.035 -0.009 -0.037*** -0.011
(0.051) (0.009) (0.052) (0.023) (0.008) (0.029)
(0.054)c (0.009)c** (0.043)c
Höör -0.032 -0.017 -0.051 -0.008 -0.0445*** 0.028
(0.060) (0.010) (0.062) (0.027) (0.010) (0.044)
(0.065)c (0.008)c** (0.062)c
Malmö -0.036 -0.080*** 0.077 0.005 -0.043*** -0.013
(0.052) (0.009) (0.054) (0.025) (0.009) (0.045)
(0.060)c (0.010)c*** (0.057)c
Lund 0.025 -0.042*** 0.063 0.053*** -0.028*** -0.027
(0.047) (0.009) (0.048) (0.020) (0.009) (0.041)
(0.051)c (0.012)c*** (0.048)c
Landskrona 0.101 0.009 0.077 0.040 0.016 -0.017
(0.099) (0.013) (0.096) (0.043) (0.012) (0.057)
(0.037)c** (0.009)c (0.040)c
Helsingborg 0.097 -0.106*** 0.005 0.036 -0.122*** -0.015
(0.087) (0.018) (0.086) (0.039) (0.017) (0.042)
(0.068)c (0.028)c*** (0.057)c
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Höganäs 0.126 0.160*** 0.174 0.053 -0.076 -0.019
(0.145) (0.043) (0.143) (0.065) (0.176) (0.091)
(0.131)c (0.031)c*** (0.108)c
Eslöv -0.035 0.010 0.040 0.011 0.026*** -0.015
(0.046) (0.007) (0.047) (0.021) (0.007) (0.032)
(0.043)c (0.006)c (0.043)c
Ystad -0.078 0.012 0.020 -0.047** 0.028** 0.029
(0.053) (0.012) (0.053) (0.024) (0.011) (0.027)
(0.038)c** (0.018)c (0.057)c
Trelleborg -0.036 -0.002 -0.211** -0.077* -0.057*** 0.021
(0.090) (0.015) (0.093) (0.041) (0.015) (0.100)
(0.113)c (0.012)c (0.092)c**
Intercept 24.604** 0.716 15.286 0.358 0.109 5.926
(10.441) (1.696) (10.946) (6.096) (1.727) (6.039)
(11.601)c** (2.024) (12.008)c
Log-L -810.084 -133.823 -633.131 - - -
LR-test 237.92 1332.58 119.11 322.12 2877.06 103.30
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
9.2 Tables, part two
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Table 9: OLS and FE 2000-2012 without neighbours, standard
errors in parenthesis. c stands for clustered standard errors, ***
denotes 1% significance, ** 5% and * 10% significance. (N=260)
OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 112.208 111.269 31.926 315.889 58.203 -35.702*
(254.328) (68.525) (23.221) (290.478) (63.277) (20.667)
(226.024)c (111.559)c (19.964)c (254.128)c (79.344)c (33.798)c
Tax index -26.929 -19.867 -4.909 -47.595 -7.723 8.344*
(50.101) (13.499) (4.574) (60.222) (13.119) (4.285)
(47.904)c (22.683)c (4.622)c (54.621)c (16.644)c (6.821)c
House prices -0.210 0.189*** 0.018 -0.919 -0.005 0.027
(0.137) (0.037) (0.013) (0.738) (0.161) (0.052)
(0.192)c (0.056)c*** (0.020)c (0.663)c (0. 094)c (0.058)c
Unemployment -74.606*** -21.820*** -5.200** -151.558*** -26.421*** 4.775**
rate (26.554) (7.154) (2.424) (32.345) (7.046) (2.301)
(47.675)c (12.452)c* (3.260)c (72.576)c** (11.762)c** (4.825)c
Population 0.010*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.014** -0.003** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000)
(0.001)c*** (0.000)c*** (0.000)c*** (0.005)c** (0.002)c (0.000)c***
Exp child care -0.008 -0.016** 0.000 0.021 0.021 -0.005
(0.031) (0.008) (0.003) (0.066) (0.014) (0.005)
(0.027)c (0.008)c* (0.005)c (0.065)c (0.017)c (0.005)c
Exp education -0.025 -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.026 -0.011 0.004
(0.032) (0.009) (0.003) (0.050) (0.011) (0.004)
(0.024)c (0.017)c (0.005)c*** (0.027)c (0.012)c (0.004)c
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OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Exp elderly care -0.007 0.000 0.004** -0.027 -0.016 -0.003
(0.019) (0.005) (0.002) (0.046) (0.010) (0.003)
(0.019)c (0.011)c (0.003)c (0.034)c (0.008)c* (0.003)c
Exp other 0.024 0.013*** 0.002 -0.059 -0.006 0.006**
(0.019) (0.005) (0.002) (0.038) (0.008) (0.003)
(0.027)c (0.014)c (0.003)c (0.052)c (0.008)c (0.003)c**
Intercept 994.395 114.127 15.358 263.235 103.889 -320.519**
(857.318) (230.990) (78.275) (2135.199) (465.124) (151.912)
(1113.494)c (451.258)c (141.909)c (1324.802)c (303.658)c (146.231)c**
R2 0.794 0.581 0.441 0.161 0.071 0.210
F-test 106.82 38.56 21.89 4.91 1.95 6.84
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000)
Table 10: OLS and FE 2000-2012 including neighbours, standard
errors in parenthesis. c stands for clustered standard errors, ***
denotes 1% significance, ** 5% and * 10% significance. (N=260)
OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 135.456 -74.897 -9.773 231.891 -24.241 -41.482*
(250.547) (50.158) (21.270) (231.562) (40.493) (22.231)
(130.181)c (64.479)c (27.926)c (159.278)c (41.061)c (36.310)c
Tax index -21.516 16.123 2.482 -42.203 5.732 9.534**
(49.433) (9.897) (4.197) (48.282) (8.443) (4.635)
(29.155)c (14.094)c (5.205)c (32.914)c (8.458)c (7.270)c
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OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
House prices -0.183 0.052* -0.013 -0.752 0.068 0.029
(0.142) (0.028) (0.120) (0.575) (0.101) (0.055)
(0.133)c (0.036)c (0.020)c (0.702)c (0.107)c (0.070)c
Unemployment -66.596** -5.687 -2.576 -90.103*** -6.509 6.136**
rate (26.216) (5.248) (2.226) (25.626) (4.481) (2.460)
(57.223)c (8.005)c (3.161)c (0.107)c** (3.327)c* (5.848)c
Population 0.006*** -0.000 0.000* 0.024*** -0.001*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000)
(0.001)c*** (0.000)c (0.000)c (0.004)c*** (0.000)c*** (0.003)c***
Exp child care -0.016 -0.003 0.005* -0.065 -0.001 -0.006
(0.030) (0.006) (0.003) (0.051) (0.009) (0.005)
(0.018)c (0.006) (0.006)c (0.039)c (0.007)c (0.004)c
Exp education -0.047 0.000 -0.011*** 0.017 0.002 0.004
(0.033) (0.007) (0.003) (0.039) (0.007) (0.004)
(0.017)c** (0.003)c (0.003)c** (0.028)c (0.004)c (0.002)c*
Exp elderly care 0.005 0.004 0.003** 0.028 0.006 -0.003
(0.019) (0.004) (0.002) (0.037) (0.006) (0.004)
(0.017)c (0.004)c (0.002)c*** (0.036)c (0.005)c (0.003)c
Exp other 0.028 0.002 -0.001 -0.040 -0.004 0.007***
(0.018) (0.004) (0.002) (0.029) (0.005) (0.003)
(0.018)c (0.003)c (0.001)c (0.039)c (0.004)c (0.003)c***
Svalöv 12.862 4.681* 0.541 -5.776 0.409 0.450
(12.961) (2.595) (1.100) (10.481) (1.833) (1.007)
(12.699)c (3.069)c (0.473)c (5.578)c (1.271)c (0.409)c
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OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Staffanstorp 2.932 0.499 -0.293 3.500 0.766 0.061
(5.196) (1.040) (0.441) (4.170) (0.729) (0.400)
(3.318)c (0.467)c (0.327)c (2.419)c (0.326)c** (0.229)c
Burlöv -13.923 -6.663*** 0.260 -17.016* -7.381*** -0.413
(11.055) (2.213) (0.938) (8.846) (1.547) (0.849)
(7.169)c* (1.071)c*** (0. 921)c (4.253)c*** (0.816)c*** (0.639)c
Vellinge -43.793 -5.275 -4.904 -26.500 -6.203 -10.684
(101.691) (20.358) (8.633) (81.159) (14.192) (7.791)
(52.365)c (5.710)c (5.233)c (55.172)c (5.108)c (6.704)c
Bjuv 72.070*** -13.426* -7.329*** 729.278*** 147.867*** 7.540
(24.612) (4.927) (2.089) (59.062) (10.328) (5.670)
(28.301)c** (9.329)c (0.925)c*** (174.172)c*** (35.521)c*** (2.926)c**
Kävlinge -2.905 -0.967 0.345 -3.732 -0.848 0.332
(4.063) (0.813) (0.345) (3.324) (0.581) (0.319)
(1.561)c* (0.467)c* (0.279)c (1.674)c** (0.380)c** (0.214)c
Lomma 22.278 -1.259 3.900 12.732 0.330 9.197
(98.188) (19.657) (8.335) (78.295) (13.691) (7.517)
(48.460)c (5.608)c (4.941)c (52.431)c (4.889)c (6.410)c
Svedala 9.972 3.506** -0.178 11.168** 3.678*** 0.279
(6.171) (1.235) (0.524) (4.828) (0.844) (0.464)
(3.909)c** (0.544)c*** (0.439)c (3.165)c*** (0.500)c*** (0.269)c
Skurup 3.101 0.720 0.261 0.235 0.215 0.006
(5.283) (1.058) (0.449) (4.287) (0.750) (0.411)
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OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(3.245)c (0.570)c (0.537)c (1.939)c (0.310)c (0.374)c
Sjöbo 3.262 0.999 0.011 5.024 1.201 0.199
(6.035) (1.208) (0.512) (4.770) (0.834) (0.458)
(2.824)c (0.620)c (0.435)c (2.442)c* (0.485)c** (0.293)c
Hörby -7.937 -3.466** -0.778 0.128 -1.806 -0.472
(8.642) (1.730) (0.734) (6.923) (1.211) (0.665)
(4.616)c (1.247)c** (0.393)c* (3.652)c (0.721)c** (0.430)c
Höör -9.296 -4.013* -0.273 -3.770 -2.682* -0.739
(10.702) (2.142) (0.909) (8.527) (1.491) (0.819)
(4.078)c** (0.836)c*** (0.836)c (3.367)c (0.582)c*** (0.540)c
Malmö 2.423 -0.696 0.624 -4.096 -1.494 0.762
(9.531) (1.908) (0.809) (7.472) (1.307) (0.717)
(4.286)c (0.594)c (0.448)c (3.131)c (0.518)c*** (0.447)c
Lund 7.266 2.844* -0.122 9.298 3.352*** 0.283
(7.958) (1.593) (0.676) (6.392) (1.118) (0.614)
(3.913)c** (0.646)c*** (0.615)c (2.981)c*** (0.567)c*** (0.417)c
Landskrona -3.637 -3.008 -0.624 14.426 1.563 -0.245
(15.171) (3.037) (1.288) (12.139) (2.123) (1.165)
(13.770)c (3.689)c (0.684)c (7.693)c* (1.796)c (0.501)c
Helsingborg -13.813 -6.486** -0.831 3.427 -2.370 -0.779
(14.107) (2.824) (1.198) (11.307) (1.976) (1.085)
(10.093)c (2.786)c** (0.729)c (7.477)c (1.634)c (0.603)c
Höganäs -81.159*** 11.141** 7.965*** -768.915*** -157.448*** -7.842
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OLS FE
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(25.077) (5.020) (2.129) (61.411) (10.739) (5.896)
(26.310)c*** (8.787)c (0.990)c*** (182.828)c*** (37.083)c*** (2.897)c**
Eslöv 1.503 -0.261 0.417 -7.253 -1.681 0.373
(7.973) (1.596) (0.677) (6.350) (1.111) (0.610)
(5.597)c (0.973)c (0.287)c (3.524)c* (0.578)c*** (0.330)c
Ystad -5.869 -3.834** 1.199 -17.339** -5.563*** 0.557
(9.034) (1.808) (0.767) (7.464) (1.305) (0.717)
(5.917)c (1.195)c*** (0.822)c (4.025)c*** (0.952)c*** (0.473)c
Trelleborg -22.093 -7.766** -1.054 -17.519 -7.204*** -1.569
(16.043) (3.212) (1.362) (12.532) (2.192) (1.203)
(7.163)c*** (1.069)c*** (0.883)c (5.886)c*** (0.933)c*** (0.772)c*
Intercept 258.406 -34.342 32.609 -729.948 -149.428 -361.960**
(872.593) (174.687) (74.077) (1709.825) (298.995) (164.154)
(633.462)c (180.894)c (53.963)c (1397.209)c (220.984)c (146.001)c**
R2 0.832 0.812 0.6075 0.570 0.693 0.263
F-test 39.40 34.33 12.27 9.63 16.42 2.60
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 11: Tobit and Heckman 2000-2012 without neighbours, stan-
dard errors in parenthesis. c stands for clustered standard er-
rors, *** denotes 1% significance, ** 5% and * 10% significance.
(N=260)
Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 3.926*** 1.996* 3.751* 0.132 -0.086 -1.172
(1.185) (1.114) (2.014) (0.778) (1.241) (2.442)
(1.407)c*** (1.356)c (2.102)c*
Tax index -0.806*** -0.483** -0.738* -0.036 -0.014 0.291
(0.233) (0.219) (0.396) (0.155) (0.249) (0.499)
(0.280)c*** (0.268)c* (0.408)c*
Ln House prices 1.114** 1.460*** 0.716 -0.237 0.457 1.441***
(0.475) (0.446) (0.813) (0.301) (0.482) (0.549)
(0.499)c** (0.873)c* (0.837)c
Unemployment -0.211* -0.356*** -0.780*** -0.108 -0.063 -0.029
rate (0.119) (0.112) (0.206) (0.070) (0.131) (0.329)
(0.125)c* (0.159)c*** (0.187)c***
Ln Population 0.928*** -0.733*** -0.059 0.858*** 0.615* 0.078
(0.227) (0.215) (0.388) (0.131) (0.332) (0.257)
(0.185)c*** (0.580)c (0.512)c
Ln Exp child -2.521*** -2.217*** -2.193* -0.307 0.028 -1.135
care (0.741) (0.700) (1.254) (0.483) (0.865) (0.942)
(0.866)c*** (1.077)c** (1.306)c*
Ln Exp -4.023** -1.551 -11.249*** -1.593 0.549 1.967
education (1.649) (1.546) (2.810) (0.988) (1.675) (5.893)
(1.416)c*** (2.469)c (2.722)c***
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Ln Exp elderly 1.065 0.538 4.595*** -0.431 -0.186 0.655
care (0.765) (0.717) (1.327) (0.464) (0.724) (1.795)
(0.658)c (1.403)c (1.220)c***
Ln Exp other -0.225 -0.512 -1.591 0.961** 0.023 0.037
(0.632) (0.590) (1.064) (0.388) (0.586) (0.790)
(0.885)c (1.069)c (0.975)c
Intercept 42.176** 44.270*** 93.431*** 12.303 -5.471 -27.489
(17.395) (16.318) (29.627) (10.585) (21.066) (53.439)
(15.772)c*** (28.686)c (28.850)c***
Log-L -453.323 -432.656 -382.172 - - -
LR-test 153.71 87.85 70.27 219.92 36.55 24.08
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Table 12: Tobit and Heckman 2000-2012 including neighbours,
standard errors in parenthesis. c stands for clustered standard
errors, *** denotes 1% significance, ** 5% and * 10% significance.
(N=260)
Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 3.141*** -0.255 2.951 -0.252 -0.296 0.032
(1.032) (0.251) (1.930) (0.584) (0.279) (1.425)
(1.164)c*** (0.235)c (1.967)c
Tax index -0.613*** 0.053 -0.545 0.058 0.060 0.034
(0.204) (0.050) (0.381) (0.116) (0.056) (0.284)
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(0.241)c** (0.044)c (0.377)c
Ln House prices 0.812* 0.280*** -0.205 -0.362 0.267** 1.534***
(0.428) (0.104) (0.816) (0.233) (0.110) (0.585)
(0.525)c (0.122)c ** (0.877)c
Unemployment -0.068 0.006 -0.553*** -0.067 0.010 -0.102
rate (0.107) (0.027) (0.203) (0.055) (0.030) (0.183)
(0.125)c (0.027)c (0.173)c***
Ln Population 0.649*** 0.097* 0.593 0.724*** 0.115 0.144
(0.224) (0.054) (0.414) (0.110) (0.078) (0.256)
(0.212)c*** (0.048)c** (0.290)c**
Ln Exp child -1.992*** 0.096 -0.604 -0.246 0.131 -1.246*
care (0.673) (0.168) (1.255) (0.376) (0.197) (0.701)
(0.846)c** (0.102)c (1.527)c
Ln Exp -3.499** 0.095 -11.574*** -1.702** 0.160 -0.476
education (1.440) (0.346) (2.698) (0.737) (0.376) (3.894)
(1.321)c*** (0.319)c (2.529)c***
Ln Exp elderly 1.452** 0.054 0.979** 0.205 0.084 1.194
care (0.698) (0.166) (1.301) (0.360) (0.166) (1.027)
(0.715)c** (0.153)c (1.238)c**
Ln Exp other -0.566 -0.107 -0.588 0.686** -0.095 -0.276
(0.555) (0.131) (1.022) (0.298) (0.131) (0.542)
(0.768)c (0.127)c (0.984)c
Svalöv -0.009 0.105*** -0.024 0.018 0.106*** -0.029
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(0.053) (0.150) (0.094) (0.026) (0.015) (0.047)
(0.047)c (0.014)c*** (0.074)c
Staffanstorp 0.008 0.075*** 0.059 0.020* 0.078*** 0.001
(0.021) (0.013) (0.040) (0.012) (0.013) (0.030)
(0.020)c (0.017)c*** (0.048)c
Burlöv -0.014 -0.084*** -0.127 -0.038* -0.090*** 0.025
(0.045) (0.017) (0.081) (0.023) (0.017) (0.066)
(0.044)c (0.018)c*** (0.102)c
Vellinge 1.502*** 0.153 0.066 0.191 0.113 0.155
(0.420) (0.109) (0.805) (0.223) (0.107) (0.432)
(0.583)c** (0.117)c (0.707)c
Bjuv 0.038 -0.221*** -0.337** 0.024 -0.075 -0.046
(0.093) (0.038) (0.164) (0.044) (0.155) (0.139)
(0.029)c (0.012)c*** (0.061)c**
Kävlinge 0.005 0.014*** 0.005 -0.010 0.014*** -0.028
(0.016) (0.005) (0.031) (0.008) (0.005) (0.019)
(0.020)c (0.010)c (0.038)c
Lomma -1.498*** -0.329*** -0.227 -0.262 -0.296*** -0.111
(0.405) (0.107) (0.780) (0.215) (0.105) (0.428)
(0.534)c*** (0.116)c*** (0.657)c
Svedala 0.014 0.023*** 0.062 0.023* 0.025*** -0.031
(0.025) (0.006) (0.045) (0.012) (0.006) (0.035)
(0.023)c (0.007)c*** (0.048)c
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Skurup 0.014 0.033*** -0.059 0.018 0.030*** 0.002
(0.022) (0.006) (0.039) (0.011) (0.006) (0.030)
(0.014)c (0.006)c*** (0.052)c
Sjöbo 0.020 0.012** 0.075* 0.027** 0.015** -0.006
(0.024) (0.006) (0.044) (0.012) (0.006) (0.034)
(0.024)c (0.006)c** (0.047)c
Hörby 0.025 -0.031*** -0.055 -0.012 -0.033*** -0.017
(0.035) (0.010) (0.063) (0.018) (0.009) (0.039)
(0.038)c (0.009)c*** (0.055)c
Höör -0.012 -0.043*** -0.104 -0.029 -0.047*** 0.026
(0.044) (0.012) (0.081) (0.023) (0.011) (0.062)
(0.046)c (0.009)c*** (0.095)c
Malmö -0.059 -0.046*** 0.092 0.002 -0.040*** -0.038
(0.039) (0.011) (0.073) (0.021) (0.015) (0.058)
(0.057)c (0.011)c*** (0.071)c
Lund -0.015 -0.022** 0.093 0.034** -0.019* -0.003
(0.032) (0.010) (0.059) (0.016) (0.010) (0.045)
(0.032)c (0.014)c (0.062)c
Landskrona 0.030 -0.001 0.039 0.019 0.001 -0.019
(0.061) (0.015) (0.102) (0.029) (0.014) (0.051)
(0.021)c (0.005)c (0.042)c
Helsingborg -0.012 -0.103*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.105*** 0.009
(0.057) (0.019) (0.102) (0.028) (0.019) (0.051)
(0.049)c (0.027)c*** (0.076)c
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Tobit Heckman
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Höganäs -0.034 0.150*** 0.341* -0.027 -0.007 0.077
(0.095) (0.043) (0.174) (0.046) (0.161) (0.133)
(0.061)c (0.026)c*** (0.102)c***
Eslöv -0.032 0.035*** 0.024 0.006 0.037*** -0.013
(0.032) (0.008) (0.060) (0.016) (0.008) (0.034)
(0.045)c (0.006)c*** (0.053)c
Ystad -0.023 0.018 0.018 -0.028 0.020 0.029
(0.037) (0.012) (0.066) (0.018) (0.012) (0.036)
(0.042)c (0.020)c (0.061)c
Trelleborg -0.005 -0.040** -0.255** -0.069** -0.051*** 0.029
(0.066) (0.017) (0.125) (0.035) (0.017) (0.120)
(0.088)c (0.018)c** (0.144)c*
Intercept 33.313** -0.184 84.542*** 9.545 -1.485 -5.580
(15.396) (3.703) (28.641) (7.956) (4.767) (31.876)
(14.383)c** (3.604)c (26.452)c***
Log-L -410.202 -37.889 -362.387 - - -
LR-test 239.95 877.38 109.84 574.39 2289.77 63.96
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
9.3 Tables, further analysis
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Table 13: FE and Tobit including expenditures per user, cluster
standard errors in parenthesis. *** denotes 1% significance, ** 5%
and * 10% significance. (N=420)
FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 203.762** 0.266 -5.474* 2.043*** 0.483*** -1.000***
(92.993) (12.249) (2.641) (0.266) (0.173) (0.273)
Tax index -49.820** 11.757*** 2.552*** -0.392*** -0.051 0.117**
(21.533) (2.730) (0.614) (0.053) (0.034) (0.055)
House prices 0.239 0.107 -0.079** -0.613 1.444*** -0.834
(0.288) (0.098) (0.030) (0.551) (0.364) (0.592)
Unemployment -81.418*** -6.567* 1.815 -0.895*** -0.232*** -0.061
rate (15.605) (3.758) (2.068) (0.115) (0.075) (0.123)
Population 0.027*** -0.002 0.001* 1.849*** -0.658*** 1.203***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.270) (0.179) (0.292)
Exp child care -0.009* -0.001 -0.000 -0.825 -0.243 1.417
/user (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (1.040) (0.683) (1.122)
Exp education -0.003** -0.000 0.000** -2.327*** -0.828 0.681
/user (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.802) (0.527) (0.871)
Exp elderly 0.008** -0.000 -0.000 -0.813 -1.195** -0.308
care /user (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.893) (0.596) (0.954)
Exp other /user -0.005 0.003 0.001 1.357** 0.317 -1.190*
(0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.587) (0.392) (0.622)
Intercept 540.654 -1052.652*** -155.623** 23.743** 19.660*** -7.386
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FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(791.227) (256.586) (67.490) (10.720) (7.031) (11.805)
R2 0.421 0.476 0.151 - - -
F-test 981.04 52.47 74.42 - - -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log-L - - - -840.207 -763.219 -669.567
LR-test - - - 177.67 73.79 46.24
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 14: FE and Tobit including expenditures per user, cluster
standard errors in parenthesis. *** denotes 1% significance, ** 5%
and * 10% significance. (N=420)
FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Tax rate 210.425* -6.576 -7.482*** 1.894*** 0.027 -1.197***
(100.805) (5.679) (2.312) (0.261) (0.041) (0.268)
Tax index -60.956** 6.354*** 2.577*** -0.363*** -0.000 0.141**
(25.024) (1.243) (0.432) (0.052) (0.008) (0.055)
House prices 0.119 0.062 -0.083** -1.068* 0.287*** -1.196**
(0.263) (0.056) (0.031) (0.545) (0.084) (0.586)
Unemployment -73.739*** -1.582 2.463 -0.789*** -0.013 0.026
rate (14.795) (3.763) (1.894) (0.113) (0.017) 0.120)
Population 0.024*** -0.004*** 0.001* 1.765*** 0.064 1.468***
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Table 14 – continued from previous page
FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.280) (0.045) (0.298)
Exp child care -0.008 -0.000 0.000 -0.857 -0.051 1.429
/user (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.998) (0.152) (1.066)
Exp education -0.004*** 0.000 0.000** -2.147*** -0.048 0.927
/user (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.773) (0.121) (0.828)
Exp elderly 0.011** -0.000 0.000 -0.249 0.081 0.399
care /user (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.874) (0.136) (0.926)
Exp other /user -0.013* 0.001 0.001 1.151** -0.041 -1.214**
(0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.568) (0.092) (0.596)
Svalöv 9.295 2.247 0.379 -0.082 0.082*** -0.046
(9.469) 1.666 (0.415) (0.081) (0.013) (0.080)
Staffanstorp -2.051 0.722* 0.306 0.000 0.077*** 0.043
(1.694) (0.369) (0.249) (0.030) (0.011) (0.031)
Burlöv -14.811* -10.216*** -1.043 0.005 -0.091*** -0.084
(8.202) 1.243 (0.799) (0.066) (0.016) (0.068)
Vellinge 40.454 -5.729 -3.757 0.967* -0.110 0.277
(46.883) (6.045) (4.592) (0.582) (0.098) (0.603)
Bjuv 16.205 -6.094** -1.256 -0.151 -0.232*** -0.322**
(18.741) (2.371) (1.224) (0.149) (0.038) (0.143)
Kävlinge -4.712* -0.941** 0.180 -0.013 0.025*** 0.021
2.476744 (0.423) (0.172) (0.024) (0.004) (0.025)
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FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Lomma -47.853 -1.869 1.516 -0.978* -0.049 -0.433
(46.077) (6.512) (4.561) (0.558) (0.094) (0.578)
Svedala 9.000** 4.926*** 0.622 0.020 0.013** 0.064*
(3.662) (0.687) (0.391) (0.037) (0.005) (0.037)
Skurup 0.638 -0.183 -0.167 -0.010 0.034*** -0.021
(1.922) (0.293) (0.329) (0.031) (0.005) (0.032)
Sjöbo -1.071 0.012 0.584* 0.059* -0.005 0.050
(3.460) (0.558) (0.327) (0.035) (0.005) (0.036)
Hörby -8.523 -4.016*** -0.722* 0.085 -0.021** -0.015
(7.493) (1.101) (0.377) (0.052) (0.008) (0.052)
Höör -7.548 -3.574*** -0.996* -0.024 -0.016 -0.041
(4.408) (0.952) (0.528) (0.061) (0.010) (0.064)
Malmö -3.979 -0.995 1.126** -0.034 -0.080*** 0.068
(2.358) (0.714) (0.482) (0.052) (0.009) (0.056)
Lund 9.118* 4.587*** 0.485 0.021 -0.041*** 0.060
(4.465) (0.698) (0.492) (0.048) (0.009) (0.050)
Landskrona -10.584 -0.505 0.670 0.103 0.007 0.119
(12.754) (1.740) (0.436) (0.100) (0.012) (0.096)
Helsingborg -16.692 -6.363*** -0.795 0.101 -0.105*** 0.037
(12.034) (1.964) (0.584) (0.088) (0.017) (0.086)
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FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Höganäs -27.031 1.104 0.343 0.168 0.159*** 0.278*
(22.585) (2.944) (1.179) (0.147) (0.043) (0.145)
Eslöv -4.805* -1.230* 0.463 -0.028 0.010 0.031
(2.479) (0.630) (0.278) (0.046) (0.007) (0.048)
Ystad -13.767*** -5.380*** 0.386 -0.059 0.011 0.016
(3.527) (0.797) (0.527) (0.053) (0.011) (0.054)
Trelleborg -17.197* -10.194*** -2.410*** -0.034 -0.002 -0.199**
(8.706) (1.714) (0.846) (0.091) (0.015) (0.096)
Intercept 1894.842 -227.588** -119.808 21.095** 2.017 -16.897
(1114.463) (98.650) (41.756) (10.636) (1.684) (11.628)
R2 0.479 0.735 0.358 - - -
F-test 981.04 52.47 74.42 - - -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log-L - - - -819.063 -133.974 -647.958
LR-test - - - 219.96 1332.28 89.46
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 15: FE and Tobit including delta tax rate, cluster standard
errors in parenthesis. *** denotes 1% significance, ** 5% and *
10% significance. (N=420)
FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
∆ Tax rate -59.141*** -16.540*** -5.301*** -0.283* 0.156 0.063
(19.409) (4.703) (1.297) (0.153) (0.099) (0.169)
Tax index -4.074 12.794*** 1.731*** -0.001 0.034*** -0.073***
(3.965) (0.961) (0.265) (0.020) (0.012) (0.024)
House prices 0.787** 0.128 -0.085*** -1.074* 1.323*** -0.614
(0.367) (0.089) (0.024) (0.590) (0.366) (0.598)
Unemployment -18.457 -3.662 1.275 -0.490*** -0.161** -0.274
rate (15.991) (3.874) (1.061) (0.115) (0.070) (0.118)
Population 0.034*** -0.001 0.001*** 2.127*** -0.584*** 1.080***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.288) (0.180) (0.295)
Exp child care 0.003 -0.001 -0.001** 3.310*** 0.618 -0.752
/user (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.986) (0.602) (0.982)
Exp education -0.006** 0.000 0.000*** -0.776 -0.532 -0.040
/user (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.848) (0.525) (0.903)
Exp elderly 0.013*** 0.000 -0.000 -1.183 -1.310** -0.111
care /user (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.961) (0.601) (0.975)
Exp other /user -0.044*** 0.002 0.002*** -0.832 -0.025 -0.134
(0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.599) (0.373) (0.620)
Intercept -1287.606** -1206.961*** -169.924*** -16.157 11.831* 13.145
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FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(597.395) (144.737) (39.948) (10.490) (6.486) (11.084)
R2 0.406 0.493 0.180 - - -
F-test 29.66 42.16 9.53 - - -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log-L - - - -864.381 -764.346 -675.383
LR-test - - - 125.28 68.52 32.72
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 16: FE and Tobit including delta tax rate and neighbours,
cluster standard errors in parenthesis. *** denotes 1% significance,
** 5% and * 10% significance. (N=420)
FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
∆Tax rate -60.601*** -13.119*** -5.194*** -0.369** 0.013 0.121
(19.924) (3.609) (1.357) (0.150) (0.022) (0.162)
Tax index -12.881*** 5.941*** 1.402*** 0.004 0.005 -0.092***
(4.563) (0.827) (0.311) (0.020) (0.003) (0.024)
House prices 0.709* 0.065 -0.094*** -1.588*** 0.283*** -0.910
(0.368) (0.067) (0.025) (0.579) (0.084) (0.594)
Unemployment -6.850 -0.745 1.531 -0.386*** -0.011 -0.238**
rate (16.189) (2.933) (1.102) (0.112) (0.016) (0.117)
Population 0.0303*** -0.003*** 0.001*** 2.007*** 0.070 1.332***
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FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
(0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.297) (0.045) (0.305)
Exp child care -0.006*** -0.001 -0.001*** 2.878*** -0.011 -1.085
/user (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.944) (0.134) (0.951)
Exp education 0.014*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.565 -0.031 -0.069
/user (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.809) (0.120) (0.856)
Exp elderly -0.051*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.360 0.080 0.523
care /user (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) (0.933) (0.137) (0.956)
Exp other /user 0.004 0.002 0.003*** -0.935 -0.059 0.078
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.581) (0.087) (0.604)
Svalöv 4.762 1.476 0.092 -0.117 0.083*** -0.028
(10.294) (1.865) (0.701) (0.084) (0.014) (0.084)
Staffanstorp -1.931 0.555 0.224 0.007 0.078*** 0.034
(4.145) (0.751) (0.282) (0.032) (0.012) (0.032)
Burlöv -15.777* -10.316*** -1.078* -0.006 -0.093*** -0.070
(9.377) (1.699) (0.639) (0.071) (0.016) (0.070)
Vellinge 43.290 -7.856 -4.874 0.813 -0.104 0.352
(80.608) (14.602) (5.489) (0.623) (0.099) (0.618)
Bjuv 6.363 -6.263* -1.142 -0.271* -0.233*** -0.256*
(18.429) (3.338) (1.255) (0.150) (0.038) (0.150)
Kävlinge -2.866 -0.886 0.168 -0.004 0.025*** 0.017
(3.525) (0.639) (0.240) (0.026) (0.005) (0.026)
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FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Lomma -52.351 0.773 2.917 -0.858 -0.058 -0.483
(77.290) (14.001) (5.263) (0.597) (0.095) (0.593)
Svedala 10.010** 4.936*** 0.611* 0.030 0.013** 0.057
(5.021) (0.910) (0.342) (0.039) (0.006) (0.039)
Skurup 1.149 -0.094 -0.138 -0.013 0.034*** -0.012
(4.388) (0.795) (0.299) (0.033) (0.006) (0.033)
Sjöbo 0.744 -0.118 0.487 0.095** -0.005 0.023
(4.935) (0.894) (0.336) (0.037) (0.006) (0.038)
Hörby -5.012 -3.548*** -0.567 0.114** -0.022** -0.030
(6.997) (1.268) (0.477) (0.055) (0.009) (0.055)
Höör -6.154 -3.293** -0.890 -0.029 -0.018* -0.031
(8.510) (1.542) (0.580) (0.065) (0.010) (0.066)
Malmö -3.289 -1.564 0.835* -0.026 -0.079*** 0.057
(7.294) (1.321) (0.497) (0.057) (0.009) (0.058)
Lund 9.501 4.654*** 0.516 0.022 -0.042*** 0.057
(6.763) (1.225) (0.461) (0.051) (0.009) (0.051)
Landskrona -1.219 0.140 0.800 0.187* 0.008 0.072
(12.072) (2.187) (0.822) (0.101) (0.013) (0.101)
Helsingborg -10.955 -5.668*** -0.569 0.147 -0.107*** 0.014
(11.078) (2.007) (0.754) (0.091) (0.018) (0.091)
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FE Tobit
Variable Total Age < 15 Age >64 Total Age < 15 Age >64
Höganäs -19.212 1.193 0.226 0.264* 0.159*** 0.226
(19.021) (3.446) (1.295) (0.150) (0.043) (0.151)
Eslöv -6.803 -1.701 0.273 -0.043 0.011 0.038
(6.307) (1.143) (0.430) (0.049) (0.007) (0.050)
Ystad -15.314** -6.044*** 0.083 -0.079 0.012 0.028
(7.646) (1.385) (0.521) (0.057) (0.012) (0.057)
Trelleborg -17.274 -9.564*** -2.103** -0.038 -0.003 -0.187*
(12.555) (2.274) (0.855) (0.098) (0.015) (0.099)
Intercept -137.174 -324.252*** -126.215*** -18.480* 1.545 9.639
(664.430) (120.362) (45.244) (10.231) (1.530) (10.855)
R2 0.464 0.744 0.232 - - -
F-test 11.03 37.70 3.85 - - -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log-L - - - -839.203 -134.166 -656.314
LR-test - - - 175.64 1328.89 70.86
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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